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FROM RIGHTS TO RESOURCES :  
THE SOUTHERN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, 1968-1974 
 
by 
 
Charles L. Zelden* 
 
 
By 1968, the court ordered civil rights “revolution” was at a crossroads.  More than 
a decade after Brown v. Board of Education1 had called for school desegregation, few 
schools were even marginally integrated.2  Southern opposition to desegregation, 
combined with a lack of direction from the Supreme Court, had left the lower federal 
courts unwilling, or unable, to demand rapid action.  Stagnation resulted.3     
 
This situation would change.  Seemingly out of nowhere, and in a very short period 
of time, the federal courts transformed the concept of civil rights, taking it in a new and 
expansive direction almost impossible to predict a mere decade before.  Reinterpreting a 
mix of government laws, regulations and past judicial orders, the courts, along with 
other branches of the federal government,  began to reallocate social and economic 
resources such as access to education, jobs, political power and housing away from the 
majority toward the social margins.4  By 1974, a system of governmnt-ordered, race 
and gender-based, redistributive remedies to the problems of the past was in place.5 The 
years immediately following saw a maturation of this system.  The result transformed 
American society and politics as group affiliation, rather than individual worth, became 
the defining standard in public life.6 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor of History, Farquhar Center for Undergraduate Studies, Nova 
Southeastern University.  A. B., 1985, Washington University; A. M., 1985, Washington 
University; Ph. D., 1991, Rice University.  The Author would like to thank Paul Finkelman, 
Tom Mackey, Scott Stoddart, Les Lindley, Alaric Burns, and Stephen Levitt for their help 
and/or comments in preparing this article. 
1  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2  J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE:  THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 101 (1976);  Billy G. Bridges, The Forty Year Fight to Desegregate 
Public Education in the Fifth Circuit and In Particular Mississippi, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 289, 
306-07 (1996).  For a discussion on compliance with Brown’s order to desegregate among the 
school districts that made up the Brown case, see generally RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN 
OF BROWN:  THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984).  
3  See generally WILKINSON, supra note 2; WOLTERS, supra  note 2. 
4  See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA:  ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONAL POLICY (1990); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). 
5  Kull, supra  note 4, at 191. 
6  See generally TERRY EASTLAND & WILLIAM  J. BENNETT, COUNTING BY RACE: EQUALITY 
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One should not underestimate the impact of this shift in public policy after 1968.  
While the civil rights’ movement’s traditional dream of a color-blind Constitution had 
often been just that -- a dream -- the formal emphasis prior to 1968 had been on 
protecting individual rights through the medium of a generally status-blind access to 
law.7  The goal was the implementation of equality through the removal of race as an 
issue of public consideration, and most civil rights laws and decisions were formulated 
-- at least technically -- to achieve that end.8      
 
The problem, as both civil rights reformers and the courts soon discovered, was that 
merely having a “right” to something was not in itself enough to assure equal treatment 
under the law.  Nor was access to a court of law an adequate remedy if the courts 
were unable, or unwilling, to provide adequate solutions to the problems faced by 
disadvantaged groups.  Rights without effective remedies are meaningless rights, and 
that was exactly the situation many Americans found themselves in by 1968. 
 
The source of this disjunction between rights and results was twofold.  The first lay 
in the problems posed by the opposition to civil rights by many white Americans, 
especially, though not solidly, in the South.9  Few in the South accepted the Supreme 
Court’s offer in Brown II10 of a voluntary process of desegregation in 1955, and this 
position of “massive opposition” to civil rights reforms continued into the 1960s.11  The 
law might have been on the side of the plaintiffs in desegregation suits, but the 
advantages in the desegregation fight usually lay with the defendant school districts 
which had the money, the legal talent and the public backing necessary to place 
significant roadblocks in the way of the district judge’s implementation of an effective 
                                                                                                                         
FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO BAKKE AND WEBER (1979); LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY 
DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS, at chs. 5-7 (1976) 
(providing a much mo re negative view on this transformation). 
7  For a discussion of movement’s formal and judicial advancements, see KULL, supra note 
4, at chs. 9-10. 
8  RICHARD POLENBERG, ONE NATION DIVISIBLE: CLASS, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES SINCE 1938, at 237 (1980). 
9  For a discussion on Southern opposition to Brown, see generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, 
THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950'S 
(1969); MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (1987); J. W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY 
MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); ROBERT A. PRATT, THE 
COLOR OF THEIR SKIN: EDUCATION AND RACE IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 1954-89, at 6-9 (1992); 
FRANK READ AND LUCY MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED:  THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE 
DEEP SOUTH (1978). 
10  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
11  See supra  note 9 and accompanying text. 
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desegregation plan (where the judge was willing to take such an action in the first 
place).12  The methods used by those opposed to desegregation were simple and 
effective:  If a case could be won on its merits, then stall the process for as long as 
possible.13  This process was exactly what occurred in most southern districts.  And, 
as early desegregation suits in Dallas, Atlanta, and New Orleans showed, the result was 
that little if any real desegregation had occurred by 1968.14 
 
Of equal importance in minimizing the effectiveness of the early civil rights laws and 
decisions were the limits built into the civil rights process by the Supreme Court.15  
Most civil rights decisions prior to 1968 focused on the political and social 
manifestations of discrimination.  As Chief Justice Earl Warren noted in Brown,16 the 
high court viewed “the evil of racial discrimination” as arising out of the feelings of 
“inferiority as to their status in the community” generated within the “hearts and minds” 
of the African-American.17  It was this sociological effect of segregation, “amply 
supported by modern authority,” that mandated the Court’s decision in Brown.18  “We 
conclude,” the Chief Justice had intoned for the unanimous Court, “that in the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.   Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal” and thus violative of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.19    
 
This approach had the advantage of flexibility.  By stopping short “of holding 
unconstitutional all racial classifications by government as impermissibly color-
conscious per se, . . . the Court was able to maximize its newly claimed authority and 
jurisdiction while minimizing limitations on its discretion in enforcing its decree and 
affording remedies” in the face of popular opposition.20  Yet “the price of  unanimity . . 
. was deliberate ambiguity,” and in 1954, unanimity on the Court was deemed essential 
if any action on civil rights was to be achieved.21    
                                                 
12  PELTASON, supra  note 9, at chs. 3-4 (providing examples of this process). 
13  Id. 
14  See, e.g., Bell v. Rippy, 133 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Tex. 1955); Bell v. Rippy, 146 F. Supp. 485 
(N.D. Tex. 1956); Calhoun v. Members of Bd. of Educ.,188 F. Supp. 401, 402 (N.D. Ga. 1959); 
Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 1 RRLR 306, 308 (E.D. La. 1963). 
15  WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 64-68.  One of the great ironies of this ambiguity in Brown, 
as we shall see, was that it permitted the federal courts to shift within a fifteen year period 
from ordering that no student may be assigned to a school because of their race to mandating 
the assignment of students based solely on race -- without having to formerly overturn the 
Brown “doctrine.”  As written, Brown could permit either interpretation. EASTLAND & 
BENNETT, supra  note 6, at 123. 
16  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
17  Id. at 494. 
18  Id. at 494. 
19  Id. at 495. 
20  GRAHAM, supra  note 4, at 368. 
21  Id. at 370; see also  Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: 
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This approach had the disadvantage, however, of ignoring the important economic 
sources of discrimination.   Poverty, in equal partnership with racism, stood in the way 
of  blacks’ efforts at improving their lives in the 1960s.  As civil rights strategist Bayard 
Rustin noted in February 1965: 
 
More Negroes are unemployed today than in 1954, and the unemployment gap 
between the races is wider.   The median income of Negroes has dropped from 57 per 
cent to 54 per cent of that of whites . . . . More Negroes attend de facto segregated 
schools today than when the Supreme Court handed down its famous decision. . . . 
And behind this is the continuing growth of racial slums, spreading over our central 
cities and trapping Negro youth in a milieu which, whatever its legal definition, sows 
an unimaginable demoralization . . .  These are the facts of life which generate 
frustration in the Negro community and challenge the civil rights movement.  At 
issue, after all, is not civil rights, strictly speaking, but social and economic 
conditions.22 
 
The civil rights movement, as shaped by the Brown23 decision’s logic, Rustin 
concluded, had only attacked “institutions which [were] relatively peripheral both to the 
American socio-economic order and to the fundamental conditions of the Negro 
people.”24   
 
This failure to correct the social and economic as well as legal foundations of  
discrimination was a primary factor fueling change in civil rights after 1968.  The reality 
in black lives was that “the residents of Harlem and Watts already enjoyed equality 
before the law,”  it simply did them little good.25  By the late 1960s, the same could be 
said for an African-American in the newly (if technically) desegregating South.  Equal 
rights under the law were not making a fundamental difference in their actual lives, and 
this failure was becoming more and more important to those affected by the twin 
burdens of discrimination and poverty. 
 
The primary effect of this expanding gap between rights and results was a growing 
pressure from minority communities (first the black and then others) to make effective 
the rights promised by the civil rights revolution, to shift the priority in civil rights away 
from “equal treatment” toward “equal results.”26   The courts and government, Bayard 
Rustin argued, needed to be concerned with “not merely . . . removing the barriers to 
                                                                                                                         
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
22  KULL, supra  note 4, at 183 (quoting Rustin).  For Rustin’s full comments, see Bayard 
Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, 39 COMMENTARY 
25 (1965). 
23  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24  KULL, supra  note 4, at 183 (quoting Rustin). 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at 183-91. 
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full opportunity but with achieving the fact of equality.”27  Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
then Assistant Secretary of Labor, concurred.28  “[T]he demand of Negro Americans 
for full recognition of their civil rights” had been met.29  “A new crisis in race relations 
[was] approaching.  In this new period the expectations of the Negro Americans will go 
beyond civil rights.  Being Americans, they will now expect that in the near future equal 
opportunities for them as a group will produce roughly equal results, as compared to 
other groups.”30 
 
The growth of the Black Power movement in 1966 and 1967 symbolized the 
growing frustration within the black community over the gap between rights and 
results.31   As Stokely Carmichael noted in an essay entitled “What We Want,” 
published in The New York Review of Books in September 1966, “Black Power . . . . 
begin[s] with the basic fact that black Americans have two problems:  they are poor 
and they are black.”32  Any reform that did not solve for these twin evils was doomed 
to failure.  Sadly, this had been the case with the civil rights movement which had up to 
then focused exclusively on issues of race.   
 
[I]ntegration speaks not at all to the problem of poverty, only to the problem of 
blackness. . . . Integration, moreover, speaks to the problem of blackness in a despicable 
way.  As a goal, it has been based on complete acceptance of the fact that in order to 
have a decent house or education, blacks must move into a white neighborhood or send 
their children to a white school.  This reinforces, among both black and white, the idea 
that “white” is automatically better and “black” is by definition inferior.   This is why 
integration is a subterfuge for the maintenance of white supremacy.33 
 
“The reality,” Carmichael concluded “is that this nation, from top to bottom, is 
racist.”34  Was it any wonder that each time blacks “saw Martin Luther King get 
slapped, they became angry;  when they saw four little black girls bombed to death, 
they were angrier;  and when nothing happened, they were steaming”?35  The civil 
rights movement “had nothing to offer . . . [the black community], except to go out and 
                                                 
27  Rustin, supra  note 22, at 27. 
28  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, THE NEGRO FAMILY: 
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965), reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCY, 
THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39 (1967). 
29  Id. at 43. 
30  Id. 
31 See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 
IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990, at ch. 5 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the Black Power movement 
between 1965 and 1970); POLENBERG, supra  note 8, at 231-34. 
32  STOKELY CARMICHAEL, What We Want, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (1966), 
reprinted in THE AGE OF PROTEST 132 (Walt Anderson, ed., 1969). 
33  Id. at 135-36 (emphasis in original). 
34  Id. at 140. 
35  Id. at 131. 
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be beaten again.”36   What was needed, if this failure of reform was to be overcome, 
was for “[b]lack people . . . to win political power, with the idea of moving on from 
there into activity that would have economic effects.”37  Ultimately, “the economic 
foundations of this country” had to be “shaken if black people [were] to control their 
lives.”38  With real power, “the masses could make or participate in making the 
decisions which govern their destinies, and thus create basic change in their day to day 
lives.”39  Without power, the evils of discrimination would only continue unchecked.40 
 
Carmichael and others in the Black Power Movement were skeptical that white 
society would grant such a redistribution of power and resources to blacks without a 
virtual revolution.41  Others in the black community, not to mention other minority 
groups, were willing to take the chance.  Despite the seeming unwillingness of the 
federal district courts to push the civil rights laws into new areas of concern without 
the direct order of an appellate court, such requests were still being placed on district 
court dockets in ever growing numbers.42  In essence, those who filed such suits 
seemed to be saying, ‘meet our needs for equality of results, or face the anger and 
revolution represented by the Black Power movement.’   
 
Yet whether the solution proposed involved revolution or reform, one thing was 
clear by the summer of 1968:  rights without effective remedies could no longer fulfill 
the ambitions of the black community.   The frustration within this community over this 
gap between rights and results was becoming increasingly explosive; in the  summers 
of 1966 and 1967, and especially following Martin Luther King’s assassination in April 
1968, this frustration had finally exploded into violence.43  In a four year period, 
hundreds of cities across the nation were engulfed for days at a time by the flames of 
urban unrest.44  Hundreds of thousands of ghetto residents took part in these riots;  
60,000 of them were arrested for their actions;  10,000 were seriously injured;  about 
                                                 
36  Id.  
37  Id. at 132. 
38  Id. at 135. 
39  Id. at 132 (emphasis in original). 
40  Id.  
41  See generally STOKELY CARMICHAEL, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION 
(1967). 
42  Donald Horowitz notes how “[the school desegregation cases] created a magnetic field 
around the courts, attracting litigation in areas where judicial intervention had earlier seemed 
implausible.”  DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 10 (1977).  For the 
statistics of civil rights filings, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1960-1968). 
43  POLENBERG, supra  note 8, at 234. 
44  See generally THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS 35 (1968) (providing numerous examples of urban unrest and violence) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS]; see also  POLENBERG, supra  note 8, at 234. 
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250 were killed.45  Most riots were ended only by the application of massive military 
strength;  in 1967, 32,000 national guardsmen and regular army soldiers were called out 
to suppresses urban riots;  in 1968 the number grew to 60,000.46   
 
These race riots had an important transformative effect on the political elite who ran 
the country and on their attitudes toward race relations and the problems of civil rights 
reform.    Those at the top of the social and political hierarchy were deeply shocked by 
the scope of the riots.  As few events before or since, the race riots “convinced 
policymakers at every level that something extraordinary had to be done to improve the 
lot of black Americans.”47  They came to believe that traditional civil rights measures 
aimed at achieving color-blind access to law as a remedy for the ills of discrimination 
simply would not -- could not -- work anymore.  The goal of a color-blind constitution 
was not abandoned, at least as a constitutional ideal;   but events dictated that such 
ideals needed to be put off for the sake of social and political harmony.48 
 
The Kerner Commission, formed after the 1967 riots to explore the causes of the 
riots, crystallized this new perception into a call for action in its final report published in 
1968.49 
 
[T]he development of a small but steadily increasing Negro middle class while 
the greater part of the Negro population is stagnating economically is creating a 
growing gap between Negroes haves and have-nots. 
 
This gap, as well as  the awareness of its existence by those left behind, 
undoubtedly adds to the feelings of desperation and anger which breed civil 
disorders.  Low-income Negroes realize that segregation and lack of job 
opportunities have made it possible for only a small proportion of all negroes to 
escape poverty and the summer disorders are at least in part a protest against being 
left behind and left out . . . 
 
What the American economy of the late 19th and early 20th century was able to 
do to help European immigrants escape from poverty is now largely impossible.  
New methods of escape must be found for the majority of today’s poor.50   
 
The question, as always, was what “new” methods to use.  The traditional methods 
associated with fighting poverty -- an expanded commitment to job creation, improved 
education and welfare supports -- were costly both in terms of financial and political 
capital.  To make a real difference in the actual lives of minorities through such 
                                                 
45  POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 234. 
46  Id. 
47  KULL, supra  note 4, at 188. 
48  Id. at 188-89. 
49  See generally COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 44, at 282. 
50  Id. 
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methods would require a serious expansion in the government’s commitment to 
domestic spending.51  Sadly, with the war in Vietnam consuming larger and larger 
segments of the government’s fiscal resources, such a call for a renewed and expanded 
war on poverty was unlikely to be funded.52   In addition, the traditional methods were 
time consuming.  The lag between reform and results could sometimes take a 
generation;  at its quickest, it still could take years to bring about visible results.  This 
time frame was too long to wait in the tense days following the riots.  As the Kerner 
Report concluded following the 1967 riots, “the vital element of time” was no longer 
available for long-term solutions.53  Whatever new methods were found to solve the 
problems of race and poverty, they would have to be implemented quickly.54 
   
Into this gap strode the federal courts.   “In the face of a sudden and universal 
conviction that the whole process would cost too much and take too long, it was 
inevitable that equality of results would come to be sought by different means.”55  
Between the obvious, but unacceptable, alternatives of doing nothing or funding a 
massive expansion of welfare programs, lay the compromise of addressing the “results 
“ of racism and poverty in minority lives through judicial action.56   This plan had the 
advantage of limiting public expenditure by abandoning “the really expensive part of the 
traditional prescription -- substantial government intervention to alter the lives of the 
truly disadvantaged.”57  At the same time, judicial action offered the advantage of 
visible, immediate results, or at least the perception of visible, immediate results  -- 
which, given the primary motivation behind this reform of muting minority frustration 
with poverty and racism, was an acceptable result to most white policymakers. 
 
The effect, whatever the immediate causes or intended results, was an expanding 
commitment within the federal judicial hierarchy to use judicial powers to achieve 
                                                 
51  For an example of the political and practical difficulties associated with traditional 
reform methods, see ALAN J. MATUSOW , THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF 
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S, at 217-21 (1984). 
52  KULL, supra  note 4, at 188-89; MATUSOW , supra  note 51, at 169-75. 
53  COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra  note 44, at 281-82. 
54  Id.  Despite its call for “new methods of escape” and its concerns for the need to act 
quickly, the Kerner Commission’s final recommendations for government action were soundly 
based in the traditional methods of employment and welfare reform.  KULL, supra  note 4, at 
188-89. 
55  KULL, supra  note 4, at 189. 
56  It should be noted that a second alternative solution existed in the form of enhanced 
administrative reform carried out by the federal executive bureaucracy.  Along with the 
solution offered by the federal courts, the administrative response would carry the load for 
civil rights reform after 1968.  The description of this response is beyond the scope of this 
article.  For a detailed and insightful description of the bureaucratic response, see generally 
GRAHAM, supra  note 4. 
57  KULL, supra  note 4, at 188-89. 
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“equality of results” in civil rights matters.58  In a series of sweeping decisions, often in 
the face of public distrust and opposition, and with seemingly little visible concern for 
the long-term effects of their actions, the federal courts once again stepped in where 
others chose not to act.  Centering their initial efforts on education, but soon moving on 
to such topics as jobs, prison conditions and political rights, these courts began to 
restructure American society.59  Surprisingly, given their initial unwillingness to demand 
significant structural change following Brown,60 but perhaps understandable given the 
tense context of the day, they chose to do this through the medium of race-based 
reallocation of resources -- what Andrew Kull has dubbed “benign racial sorting”  and 
Hugh David Graham the “compensatory theory of preferential discrimination.”61   
 
The effect of this shift in Civil Rights enforcement priorities away from the 
individual toward the group -- and from color-blind nondiscrimination to preferential 
(i.e. color-based) discrimination -- was explosive.62  The concept that an individual had 
valid claims on the public realm for enhanced access to social, economic and political 
resources based not only on their own personal merits, but also on their group 
affiliations, produced a radical re-orientation in American law and in the way  most 
Americans lived their everyday lives.63    Suddenly, one’s standing in the community 
depended as much on one’s membership in a particular sub-group of the society as 
their own skills, morals and actions.64   As applied by the federal courts, those long on 
                                                 
58  See generally DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 
(1995). 
59  For a good summary of the changes brought by court order after 1968, see GRAHAM, 
supra  note 4, at 375-85.  For educational reform, compare WILKINSON, supra  note 2, with 
GRAGLIA, supra  note 6 (Gragllia gives a more negative view of education reform).  On job 
discrimination see, HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991).  For prison reform, see BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS 
UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT TAKEOVER OF GEORGIA PRISONS (1991); LARRY W. 
YACKLE,  REFORM AND REGRET:  THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989).  On voting rights, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE 
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT , 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, eds. 
1994); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY 
VOTING RIGHTS (1987). 
60  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
61  GRAHAM, supra  note 4, at 370; KULL, supra  note 4, at ch. 11 (chapter entitled “Benign 
Racial Sorting”). 
62  Large numbers of studies exploring the impact of the post-Brown civil rights revolution 
on American society have been published.  Evaluations have varied as to whether the 
changes have been positive or negative, however, all agree that the effects were both 
significant and long lasting.  See generally ARMOR, supra  note 58; EASTLAND & BENNETT, 
supra  note 6; NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (Harvard University Press, 1987); GRAGLIA, supra  note 6; WOLTERS, supra  note 2. 
63  See supra  note 62. 
64  See generally TERRY EASTLAND,  ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:  THE CASE FOR 
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the outside of American life could now successfully make demands on the government, 
the courts and society as a whole, for enhanced access to schools, jobs, or other 
rights.65   This meant a whole new way of doing business not only for the government, 
but for all Americans.66  The ramifications of this shift have been felt to the present. 
 
The point here is not whether the shift to group-based remedies in civil rights was a 
good or a bad thing for the nation.   Judgements as to the proper standards and 
methods for distributing social, economic and political resources across the many 
segments of the nation are a matter of personal interpretation and conscience.  Strong 
arguments for or against group-based remedies can be, and have been, made by many 
commentators and critics.67   What is significant here is that it was the federal courts 
which chose to act in these matters and, largely on their own, initiate a policy shift of 
such magnitude.  That they chose to act in this particular sweeping manner -- that they 
chose to act at all -- is both surprising and ironic given the federal courts prior 
history.68 
 
It is even more surprising and ironic that much of the construction of this shift lay 
within the district courts.  The vast majority of federal district judges were white, 
upper-class members of the power elite of this nation.69  Most, even where they were 
not segregationist or racist, questioned their role in civil rights matters.70  As they saw 
it, their job as federal district judges was primarily focused on economic matters and 
concerns.  Protecting property, and promoting economic expansion so more people 
                                                                                                                         
COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996). 
65  GRAHAM, supra  note 4; KULL, supra  note 4, at ch. 11. 
66  See generally Graham, supra  note 4; KULL, supra  note 4, at ch. 11. 
67  For critiques of preferential discrimination, see ARMOR, supra  note 58; KIRSTIN 
BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY:  THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988); 
EASTLAND, supra note 64; EASTLAND & BENNETT, supra  note 6; GRAGLIA, supra  note 6.  For 
positive descriptions of this process, see LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: 
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); DEREK BOK & WILLIAM G. 
BOWEN,  THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN 
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998). 
68  On the federal court’s relationship, or lack of relationship, to matters of civil rights and 
liberties prior to Brown, see JOHN BREMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD 
COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1988).  See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). 
69  See ROBERT CARP & RONALD STIDHAM,  THE FEDERAL COURTS 97-99 (1985); see 
generally Kermit Hall, The Children of the Cabins: The Lower Federal Judiciary, 
Modernization, and the Political Culture, 1789-1899, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (1980); SHELDON 
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH 
REAGAN 58-59, 104-5, 147-9, 189-91, 227-9, 276-8, 338-40 (1997).  On the makeup of the federal 
bench as a whole, see BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES , JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES  (2d ed.1983). 
70  See generally PELTASON, supra note 9. 
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could own private property was their priority.71  For years these judges had 
procrastinated in enforcing the mild changes called for by Brown.72   Now, suddenly, 
under the prompting of the Supreme Court, they would take the lead in transforming the 
very foundations of our society.    
 
And take a lead they did.  For while the goal of producing visible results in civil 
rights matters came quickly, as did the commitment in the appellate courts to extreme 
solutions, the application of status-based methods of enforcement would come 
piecemeal out of the district courts in response to enforcement difficulties in integration 
and other civil rights cases.  Making an affirmative commitment to promote racial 
mixing in the schools or on the job was one thing, pulling it off in practice was another 
thing entirely.    It was in response to the practical difficulties in complying with 
Supreme Court directives to promote immediate integration that a model for a system of 
group-based remedies was found and applied.  This model, based in large part on 
enforcement tools found in the federal court’s traditional economic caseload and 
powers, and adopted by most district judges in integration matters, provided the district 
courts with a familiar set of procedures capable of satisfying the Supreme Court’s 
demands for immediate action and the minority community’s demand for visible results. 
  Such compliance came with a price, however.  For implicit within the business 
enforcement model lay a commitment to group-based remedies.  In fact, once the basic 
components of this model was adopted, the shift to a group-based, results oriented 
jurisprudence was, if not inevitable, hard to stop.  In this regard, education cases in the 
distric t courts, with their many practical enforcement problems, served as a proving 
ground for subsequent reorientations of American society though judicial ordered 
reforms. 
 
1. The Supreme Court (Finally) Speaks: The Shift From Desegregation to Integration 
                                                 
71  The above view of the lower federal judiciary is the conclusion of a larger study being 
conducted by the author.  Complete citations of this trend are beyond the scope of this 
article.  However, for a general view of the district bench and their attitudes toward their role 
as judges, see generally TONY FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1979); TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, THE SWIFT 
AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND 
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992); 
CHARLES ZELDEN,  JUSTICE LIES IN THE DISTRICT : THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT OF TEXAS, 1902-1960 (1993). On 
the nature and content of district court caseloads, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  (1870-1939); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1940-PRESENT); see also  David S. 
Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in 
the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981). 
72  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see generally ANTHONY LEWIS, 
PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1964); PELTASON, supra note 9;  
J. WILKINSON, supra note 2. 
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The shift toward race-based civil rights in education began quickly in the tense days 
following the start of urban unrest.  It began at the middle level of the judicial pyramid, 
the Circuit Courts of Appeals, which voiced for the first time the federal court’s 
growing commitment to equality of results.73  The initiative then moved up the judicial 
ladder to the Supreme Court -- which soon expanded upon the circuit court’s approach, 
creating in the process a mandate for immediate action in school desegregation 
matters.74  Concurrently, questions of enforcement were returned to the district courts, 
which faced the many problems of implementing in the real world context the policies 
handed down from above.  Enforcement problems, in turn, forced district judges to 
produce innovative solutions to meeting the problems of race.  The Supreme Court’s 
subsequent response to these solutions then generated new and expansive civil rights 
policies, which once again generated new enforcement problems.  And so the pattern 
went on and on, until, unexpectedly and largely unintentionally, a revolution in civil 
rights law in education occurred. 
 
In just over a single year, in four cases75 authored by Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor 
Wisdom, the concept that any  “classification based on race is inherently discriminatory 
and violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”76 was 
replaced by the understanding that “the only adequate redress for a previously overt 
system-wide policy of segregation directed against Negroes as a collective entity is a 
system-wide policy of integration.”77  In practical terms, this shift in emphasis created a 
positive duty on the part of school boards to officially classify students in regards to 
their race as a means to integrate their schools at all costs.  “The time has come for 
foot-dragging public school boards to move with clarity toward desegregation,” Judge 
Wisdom decreed.78  The sole question needing to be resolved in school cases was “how 
far have formerly de jure segregated schools progressed in performing their affirmative 
constitutional duty to furnish equal educational opportunities to all public school 
                                                 
73  See Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) 
(hereinafter Singleton I); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 
1966) (hereinafter Singleton II); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub. nom.,  Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 
(1967) (hereinafter Jefferson I); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub. nom., Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 
(1967) (hereinafter Jefferson II). 
74  See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of 
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970). 
75  See supra  note 73. 
76  Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm’n, 168 F. Supp. 149, at 151 (E.D. La, 1958) (Judge 
Wisdom writing for a three-judge court). 
77  Jefferson I, 372 F. 2d at 836, 869 (emphasis in original). 
78  Singleton I, 348 F.2d at 729. 
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children?”79  The only acceptable answer to this question, in turn, was a “school 
desegregation plan. . . that works.”80  And, in Judge Wisdom’s view, any plan that did 
not completely eradicate the existing dual-system of education was an inadequate 
answer;  “Faculties, facilities and activities as well as student bodies must be 
integrated.”81 
 
These four circuit court cases,82 which have been called “the most important 
doctrinal change[s] in interpretation” of integration, “since Brown itself,”83 lay the 
groundwork for the Supreme Court’s adoption of integration as the primary goal in 
school cases in Green v. County School Board.84  The Green85 case arose out of a fact 
situation which perfectly exemplified the post-Brown86 failures of desegregation.87  
New Kent County, a small rural county in eastern Virginia with very little residential 
segregation and its student population almost evenly divided between white and black, 
had two schools.88  Prior to Brown,89 the school on the east side of the county had 
been exclusively for whites, while that on the west was for blacks.90  Following Brown, 
this racial split continued almost unchecked.  In 1965, a freedom-of-choice 
desegregation plan was imposed by the Eastern District of Virginia.91  However, under 
this plan, no white students had ever chosen to attend the black school, and only 15 per 
cent of the district’s black students transferred to the formerly all-white school.92 
 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice William Brennen found against the school 
district.93  The “pattern of separate ‘white’ and ‘Negro’ schools in the New Kent 
County school system established under compulsion of state laws is precisely the 
pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II were particularly addressed, and 
which Brown I declared unconstitutionally denied Negro school children equal 
protection of the laws,” wrote Brennen.94  The 1965 desegregation plan had not 
                                                 
79  Jefferson I, 372 F.2d at 896. 
80  Id. at 847. 
81  Id. at 868. 
82  See supra  note 73. 
83  Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. 
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 20 (1975). 
84  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
85  Id. 
86  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
87  See Green, 391 U.S. at 435, 437-40. 
88  Id. at 432. 
89  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
90  Green, 391 U.S. at 432. 
91  Id. at 433-34. 
92  Id. at 441. 
93  Id. at 441-42. 
94  Id. at 435. 
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worked.  The token desegregation of the past, which the Justice noted was only a first 
step in the creation of unitary, nonracial education system for all students, was not 
adequate to meet the dictates of Brown.95  School authorities had “the affirmative duty 
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”;  the courts, in turn, had the 
affirmative duty to force this end where necessary.96  The time for bold action had 
come, Brennen argued.97  “The burden on a school board today,” he wrote, “is to come 
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to 
work now.”98  Anything less was unacceptable. 
 
Brennen’s point was clear;  effectiveness in achieving integration, judged largely in 
terms of numbers, was to be the new standard to be used in desegregation cases.  
Applying this new standard to the facts of the case in Green,99 the Supreme Court ruled 
that “‘[f]reedom of choice’ is not a sacred talisman;  it is only a means to a 
constitutionally required end -- the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects. 
If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other 
means must be used to achieve this end.”100  Given the lack of effective integration in 
New Kent County, new methods were clearly called for.101 
 
The High Court therefore remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit, expecting (or 
perhaps simply hoping) that the point had now been made and enforcement of 
immediate integration could be left in the hands of the district and circuit courts.  The 
judges of these lower courts, however, had trouble believing that the Supreme Court 
meant exactly what it said in Green.  Though they were to set about enforcing the 
Supreme Court’s dictates in these matters, they modified the meaning of “immediate” to 
minimize the disruptions which integration could bring to the education process.102  Yet 
the Supreme Court was unwilling to brook any modifications of its Green103 order.104  
Thus, one year after its decision in Green,105 in response not only to the willingness of 
the lower federal courts to accept delays in integration, but to the growing opposition to 
immediate integration by state school officials and within the federal executive branch, 
                                                 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 437-38. 
97  Id.  
98  Id. 
99  Id. at 439. 
100  Id. at 440 (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F. 2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967) 
(Sobeloff, J., concurring)). 
101  Id. at 441-42. 
102  See WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 118-20. 
103  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
104  WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 120. 
105  391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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the Supreme Court made even more explicit its commitment to this end.106  In two 
separate cases, Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education107 and Carter v. West 
Feliciana Parish,108 the Supreme Court issued peremptory orders mandating immediate 
integration as the only proper response to continuing educational segregation, even 
when this entailed the relocation of hundreds of thousands of school children in the 
middle of the school year.  In Alexander, an appeal from the Fifth Circuit which had 
bowed to political pressure to delay the integration of some thirty school districts in 
Mississippi, the Court held that “[T]he Court of Appeals should have denied all motions 
for additional time, . . . . Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every 
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and 
hereafter only unitary schools.”109  Carter,110 which arose from the Fifth Circuit’s 
continued disbelief that the Supreme Court really meant what it said, was as emphatic 
an order as the High Court made:  on appeal, the Court peremptorily reversed the Fifth 
Circuit with the comment to get on with the job at hand.111   
 
In the years to come, the Supreme Court would expand and contract on the reach of 
the doctrine of immediate and massive integration.112  But, as far as the district courts 
were concerned the call to arms had been made.  Like it or not, the focus had shifted in 
educational civil rights.  Desegregation was not enough; the new goal was integration, 
and integration now. 
 
2. New Burdens, Old Problems:  Enforcing Integration in the Southern District Courts 
 
The effect of this shift in the views of the federal judiciary’s appellate policy-makers 
placed a new and heavy burden on the district courts.  It was a different burden, however, 
than the burden created by Brown.113  The burden of Brown114 grew out of the lack of 
direction given the district judge by appellate courts.115  Brown II,116 which had ordered 
                                                 
106  For more on the growing frustration of Supreme Court with delays brought on by state 
opposition to immediate integration, see WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 120.  For a different read 
on the Supreme Court’s mind set in these matters, but one that agrees that the High Court 
was in a mood to demand action, see GRAGLIA, supra  note 6, at ch. 6. 
107  396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
108  396 U.S. 290 (1970). 
109  Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20. 
110  396 U.S. 290 (1970). 
111  Id.  For a description of the politics behind Alexander and Carter, see READ & 
MCGOUGH, supra  note 9, at ch. 13; GEORGE R. METCALF , FROM LITTLE ROCK TO BOSTON:  THE 
HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, at chs. 4-5 (1983).   
112  See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. Denver 
Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Millikan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); University of California 
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
113  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
114  Id. 
115  Judge Frank Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama argued that the implementation 
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desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” placed the primary responsibility for 
implementing this desegregation with the district courts and then left these courts 
exposed to the resulting anger and frustrations of a community undergoing change.  As 
J. Harvie Wilkinson put it, “Brown II . . . resembled nothing more than an order for the 
infantry to assault segregation without the prospects of air or artillery support.”117  Add 
to this fact that most of the infantry not only lacked enthusiasm for the job in the first 
place but disputed their very roles as infantry in these matters, and it should not be 
surprising that given a choice between bold action and procrastination, most federal 
district judges chose the latter path.118 
 
The Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Jefferson and Singleton and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Green, Alexander and Carter lifted the district judges’ burden of isolation.  
The choice in desegregation suits had been taken out of the hands of district judges.  
Their job was to desegregate dual school districts through the method of immediate 
integration.  No excuses would be accepted;  no delays tolerated;  and where necessary, 
the blame could be placed on the Supreme Court. 
 
The Green decision meant that district judges could no longer ignore the demands 
for action made by plaintiffs in school desegregation cases.  Yet, despite the explicitness 
of the new policy, many problems still remained.  Green’s dismissal of the freedom-of-
choice plan in New Kent raised the first problem.  If a freedom-of-choice plan that had 
a fifteen per cent success rate (which was about as successful an integration ratio as 
could be found in the South) was not adequate enough to meet the burden of Brown,119 
what was? 120  How much actual integration had to take place before the new standards 
were achieved?  Secondly, and more importantly, what methods should the district 
courts use to achieve this end?  In a footnote to Green the High Court suggested two 
                                                                                                                         
order in Brown II was inherently flawed.  “That second decision was very, very general and 
said district courts should do it with deliberate speed.  If they’d said, ‘you’re to start within 
one year with the first grade and add one grade each year,’ it would have all been done in 
twelve years.”  JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. 
JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 273 (1993) (quoting Judge Johnson). 
 Political scientist J. W. Peltason agreed with this view noting that “[district] judges . . . do 
what they must . . . [but]  they can hardly be expected on their own initiative to move against 
the local power structure.  If their instructions from above are ambiguous, the ambiguity will 
be resolved to conform to the judge’s own convictions and the mo res of his district.”  
PELTASON, supra  note 9, at 12-13. 
116  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
117  WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 81. 
118  For other examples of district judge discomfort with the job of ordering desegregation, 
see generally PELTASON, supra  note 9. 
119  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
120  For a discussion of the numbers game in Green and its implications for other districts 
across the South, see WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 115-17. 
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such methods as consolidating one white and one black school together -- “one site . . . 
serving grades 1-7 and the other  . . . serving grades 8-12” -- and geographical zoning -
- with students attending integrated neighborhood schools.121  Yet New Kent was a 
rural county with a relatively little residential segregation.122  What methods would be 
required to achieve integration in urban areas where residential segregation made such 
neighborhood based plans inadequate to meet the remedies required by Green?  How far 
would the district courts have to go in promoting “integration now?” 
 
It was in facing these problems that the new burden on district judges was 
created.123   Far from being an easy process, immediate integration proved to be a 
difficult endeavor, one that required constant effort and innovation on the part of the 
district courts.  Further, even where the district courts proved innovative in finding 
solutions, the practical and procedural problems of integration often stood in the way of 
effective reform.    
 
Consider the problem of white flight.  Prodded by the Fifth Circuit, district judges 
throughout the South began to order the immediate integration of de jure segregated 
school districts.124  The result, by 1971, was to make the South into the most integrated 
section in the nation.125  Reaction against this integration was swift, however.  In 
Mississippi, for example, white enrollment in those counties affected by court ordered 
integration dropped twenty-five percent between 1968 and 1970.126  Some districts saw 
a ninety percent, and in one case, a one hundred percent drop in white enrollment.127  
In Clarendon County South Carolina, one of the five original school districts in Brown, 
ninety-nine percent of district’s white students transferred to a private, Baptist parochial 
school following a post-Green integration order.128  The result, despite the federal 
courts best efforts to achieve the explicit intent of Green (integration), was that many 
black students remained in segregated schools, while in other cases, the percentage of 
                                                 
121  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 n.6. (1968). 
122  KULL, supra  note 4, at 194. 
123  It should be noted that this burden was shared by the judges of the Fifth Circuit who, 
through appeals from the decisions of the district courts, heard over 166 desegregation cases. 
 If anything, between December 1969 and September 1970, the burden on the judges of the 
Fifth Circuit was greater than that on any of the individual district judges who they were 
directing in these cases.  On the workload of the Fifth Circuit, see Read, supra  note 83, at 32 
n.108. 
124  A summary listing of court orders to implement immediate integration following Green 
can be found in 2 LEON JONES, FROM BROWN TO BOSTON: DESEGREGATION IN EDUCATION, 1954-
1974, at 1730 (1979). 
125  HEW estimates placed 44 percent of black pupils in majority white schools in the South 
by 1971 as compared to only 28 percent in the North and West.  118 CONG. REC. 564 (daily ed. 
Jan. 20, 1972) (statement of Sen. Stennis). 
126  WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 121. 
127  Id. 
128  WOLTERS, supra  note 2, at 165. 
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race mixing was significantly less than it might otherwise have been. 
 
Integration also proved to be a time consuming and complex process, the effects of 
which raised new problems for the district courts.  Final solutions in a desegregation 
suit were little more than a hope.  Often, by the time a district judge solved one 
problem, two new problems needing innovative solutions arose.   The solutions to these 
problems, in turn, generated even more difficulties that needed to be solved.  Such 
cases dragged on for years on a court’s docket.  Often, shifts in Supreme Court policy 
negated the solutions reached on the district level, or at the very least, promoted new 
appeals whose resolution put off, yet again, the ultimate conclusion of the case.129  All 
this action was dependant, of course, on the willingness of the district judge to be 
innovative.   
 
The nature and scope of the problems posed by enforcement of integration -- and 
some of the solutions attempted -- can be seen through the example of United States v. 
Texas.130  The origins of United States v. Texas131 lay deep in East Texas where, more 
than a decade after Brown,132 segregated schools were still the norm.133   The case 
initially involved two neighboring school districts, Daingerfield ISD and Cason ISD.  
Daingerfield’s student population was mostly white; Cason’s was predominantly 
black.134  For years, the Daingerfield schools had accepted transfers of white students 
from the Cason ISD.135  In 1968, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s 
Office for Civil Rights informed Daingerfield school administrators that these transfers 
were in violation of the civil rights laws (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 
decisions of the Supreme Court.136  They ordered the school to stop accepting 
transfers.137  The district did so.138  Subsequently, white citizens in Cason responded 
by petitioning the state government to detach the white portions of Cason and annex it 
                                                 
129  A clear example of these events can be found in Green v. County School Board , 391 
U.S. 430 (1968). 
130  The most important of these decisions are: United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 
(E.D. Tex. 1970), supplemented by 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex.), aff’d as modified, 447 F.2d 441 
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971); United States v. Texas, 342 F.Supp. 24 (E.D. 
Tex. 1971), aff’d, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Texas, 356 F.Supp. 469 (E.D. Tex. 
1972), aff’d, 495 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1974); see also  FRANK R. KEMERER, WILLIAM WAYNE 
JUSTICE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1991); POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT , SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION IN TEXAS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES V. STATE OF TEXAS (1982). 
131  321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970). 
132  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
133  KEMERER, supra note 130, at 118. 
134  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1046. 
135  Id. at 1048. 
136  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 117; see also  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1048-
50. 
137  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 117. 
138  Id. 
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to Daingerfield, which the state did.139  The resulting expanded school district split the 
Cason ISD in half.140  This meant that black Cason students had to be bused across 
Daingerfield school district lines to go to school.141  Such busing across district lines 
was contrary to Texas state law.142  It was also in direct violation of federal civil rights 
laws.143 
 
Investigating further, HEW officials soon found other examples of segregation 
though the medium of split white/black majority districts.144    A number of these 
districts experienced similar boundary changes “which resulted in the removal of all, or 
virtually all, white children from the now all-black districts and the siphoning off of 
black students from neighboring districts with bi-racial enrollments.”145  Since many of 
these schools received no federal funds (and under Title VI, HEW’s sole weapon 
against segregated schools was the termination of federal aid) the matter was referred 
to the Justice Department.146  
 
Attorney’s in that department’s Civil Rights Division soon found even more 
examples of a dual school systems contiguous with largely white districts throughout 
Texas.147    In most cases, these all-black districts lacked the resources of white 
districts.148  One such district, the all-black Jeddo District in Bastrop County outside of 
Austin, consisted of a one-room schoolhouse with two outhouses located on a remote 
dirt crossroad.149  The District employed one teacher and a teacher’s aid.150  Average 
attendance was fifteen students, the minimum required under state law to receive state 
financial aid.151  And, in order to meet this number, three black students were bussed 
from the neighboring all-white Smithfield ISD.152 
 
Convinced that a case by case approach would prove inadequate to meet the scope 
of the problem (not to mention take almost forever to litigate) Justice Department 
                                                 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 118. 
145  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1049 (E.D. Tex. 1970). 
146  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 117. 
147  Id. at 118. 
148  Id. 
149  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1050. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  Id.  (noting that of the nine all-black school districts that ultimately were included in 
the case, all but three had less than one hundred students); see also  KEMERER, supra  note 
130, at 118. 
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lawyers sought to combine these cases into a single action.153  They achieved this 
combination through the simple expedient of including both the State of Texas and the 
Texas Education Agency (TEA) in the complaint along with the offending school 
districts and associated school officials.154  The complaint, filed in March 1970, 
justified this inclusion by arguing that the present system of inferior all-black school 
districts adjoining predominantly white school districts was the result of state action or 
inaction -- a violation of both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.  In particular, it argued that “the state of Texas, through the Texas 
Education Agency, ha[d] failed, as the chief supervisory body of public education in 
Texas . . . adequately to oversee and supervise the districts within the State so that no 
child [was] denied on the grounds of race the benefits of programs supported by 
federal funds.”155 
 
  This approach had the advantage of allowing the district judge to place the entire 
state education system under court order and thus facilitate a state-wide remedy.  The 
question was, would the district judge accept this consolidated approach?  The Justice 
Department’s proposal was still a novel concept in 1970.  Most prior desegregation 
suits had been limited to only a handful of school districts at most.156  Few complaints 
had included state education agencies.  Only a couple of recent decisions had included 
the state education system as a whole.157  Further, this approach raised jurisdictional 
problems.  Texas had four federal districts courts.  The schools named in this suit (not 
to mention other school districts not named but included by virtue of the state’s 
inclusion in this case) were spread out across all four districts.  Tradition argued for the 
independence of individual district courts.158  For one judge to assume authority over 
matters in another district was unprecedented.  To do so in three other districts was 
unthinkable.  Yet assuming authority was exactly what the plaintiffs asked the court to 
attempt.159 
 
Cognizant of the unique nature of their request, Justice Department lawyers had 
searched carefully for an appropriate district in which to file their case.   Their choice 
was the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas.  They chose to file in this 
court for two related reasons.  First, this particular division had only one judge 
presiding, which meant that they knew exactly who the judge hearing the case would 
                                                 
153  Id. 
154  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1045. 
155  Id. at 1045-46. 
156  See generally JONES, supra note 124, at 1069 (providing abstracts of most 
desegregation judgements in education and showing examples of how most desegregation 
suits prior to 1970 were limited to a single school district). 
157  E.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (combining 
sixty-two Alabama school districts under a single class action desegregation order). 
158  See CARP & STIDHAM, supra  note 69, at 25. 
159  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970). 
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be.160  Second, that judge was William Wayne Justice, a liberal Johnson appointee 
known both for his pro-integration views and his willingness to apply extensively the 
powers of his court.161 
 
It was a good choice on the plaintiff’s part.  Justice took civil rights problems, and 
the role of his court in providing solutions to those problems, very seriously.162  In a 
1969 desegregation case, United States v. Tatum ISD,163 filed soon after the judge took 
to the bench, Judge Justice had acted quickly when the Tatum school board suddenly 
backed out of an HEW approved integration plan.  Within a week of the case being filed 
in his court, the judge produced and ordered implementation a new integration plan, one 
in complete compliance with the Green doctrine.164  At a time when most district judges 
were still dragging their feet in desegregation matters, Justice’s work was fast.  
Similarly, when a Nixon Administration policy shift away from supporting school-
consolidation remedies in desegregation suits threatened the entire strategy of the 
Justice Department lawyers in United States v. Texas,165 the judge would “order” these 
lawyers to continue with their present strategy (“though he understood, of course, that 
they would have represent whatever position the Justice Department approved”).166   
                                                 
160  Most federal district courts are divided into separate divisions, each division holding 
court in a different city in the district.  Usually, a district judge is assigned to be the resident 
judge in one of these division courts (though he can and often does hear cases in any of the 
other divisions in the district).  Where more than one judge is assigned to a division, cases 
are divided up among the sitting judges randomly.  This means that were only one judge is 
assigned to a division, that judge will hear all of the cases filed in that division, but where 
more than one judge sits, that judge will hear only a portion of the cases filed.  Needless to 
say, litigants who want to know exactly which judge will hear their case will tend to seek out 
divisions with only a single judge assigned.   
161  On Justice’s background and judicial/political views, see KEMERER, supra  note 130. 
162  “The law is full of interstices” Judge Justice noted in a 1978 interview.  Laura 
Richardson & Jo Clifton, William Wayne Justice: An Interview, TEXAS OBSERVER, January 20, 
1978, at 5.   
If the law is settled -- I’m a professional -- I’m going to decide the case just exactly 
the way the law reads.  On the other hand, if there is some vacancy or gap, I try to 
take into consideration what the Supreme Court has said about ‘the evolving 
standards of decency.’  I think the law ought to be decent if it’s nothing else.  It 
ought to afford justice.   
Id.  This commitment to ‘affording justice’ made Judge Justice an exceptionally activist judge, 
one who -- on par with Judge Johnson of Alabama -- “was quite willing, even desirous, of 
doing what was right” for the plaintiff in a civil rights case.  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 152 
(quoting Peter Sandmann, plaintiffs’ attorney in Morales v. Turman, 326 F. Supp. 667 (E. D. 
Tex. 1971)). 
163  306 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Tex. 1969). 
164  Id. at 287-88. 
165  321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970). 
166  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 119 (quoting Justice Department Lawyer, Alexander 
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Given this commitment to enforcing the Supreme Court’s civil rights orders, the 
judge’s decision in United States v. Texas came fully down on the side of the plaintiffs. 
  Testimony at the trial, the judge ruled, fully established the disparate and segregated 
nature of the defendant school districts.167  Boundary changes, liberal student transfers 
policies and state support of small school districts had all resulted in “isolating racially 
homogeneous residential areas into formal political enclaves,” entrenching existing 
patterns of segregation, and thus  “insur[ing] its continuation after its legal basis was 
declared unconstitutional.”168   The result was the creation of dual school systems in 
violation of federal law.169 
 
Citing both Brown II’s170 mandate to the federal district courts to oversee the 
desegregation of dual school districts and Green’s171 affirmative duty to take all steps 
necessary to eliminate racial discrimination “root and branch,” Justice then took up the 
challenge posed by the plaintiff’s initial complaint and fashioned a broad remedy 
designed to bring about state-wide integration.172  He achieved this end in two parts.  
First Justice ordered those school districts named in the original suit to collaborate with 
the TEA and the U.S. Office of Education to produce an integration plan that would 
assure both faculty and staff desegregation and the non-discriminatory assignment of 
students.173  The judge then went on to place the primary responsibility for assuring 
school desegregation in all Texas school districts with the TEA.174  He did this in part 
because of the expertise possessed by the agency, an expertise “this court did not 
posses.”175  But even more so, the judge placed this burden on the TEA because of the 
agency’s past support of segregated dual school districts.176  In essence, Justice sought 
to use the TEA to reform a situation it helped create and which only it, in large measure, 
could end.  The TEA was therefore ordered to immediately halt all discriminatory inter-
district transfer of students and district boundary changes.177  Thereafter, the agency 
was ordered to work with HEW’s office of education to reevaluate its policies.178 
                                                                                                                         
Buek). 
167  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1051. 
168  Id. at 1050-51. 
169  Id. at 1052. 
170  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
171  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
172  United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1971). 
173  Id. 
174  United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1056-57 (E.D. Tex 1970). 
175  Id. at 1057. 
176  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 119. 
177  United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d at 442-49. 
178  In all, Judge Justice specified eight areas of responsibility for the TEA:  (1) to review 
and deny all transfer requests that fostered segregation;  (2) to investigate school boundary 
changes for racial impact;  (3) to examine annually school transportation routes to determine if 
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The judge made this ruling despite the fact that the TEA, though formally charged 
with overseeing the state’s public school system, was in practice less a regulatory 
agency than an oversight committee facilitating local control over education (and thus 
had no real authority or power to desegregate the public schools).179  Having facilitated 
both the creation and continued existence of an unconstitutional dual school system 
whatever its actual powers, the judge held the burden to desegregate the Texas schools 
was squarely on the back of the TEA. 180 
 
The use of the TEA as an enforcement arm of the court proved to be a fateful 
choice in terms of achieving substantial integration.   The TEA did not want the job.  Its 
primary constituency lay with the offending school districts, and they strongly opposed 
the Court’s order.181  Left alone, the TEA would never have chosen to promote 
integration;  yet refusing to enforce the Court’s order meant facing significant penalties. 
 The result was lip-service by the TEA in favor of the order, while a steady pattern of 
delay and minor obstructionism undermined its effectiveness.182  
 
Take, for example, the order requiring the TEA to monitor all districts with a 
minority enrollment of 66 percent or greater.183  In most years this meant some 200 
school districts scattered across the state.184  As per the judge’s order, the Technical 
Assistance Division of the TEA dutifully checked each of these 200 schools.  
Considerable staff time and resources were spent on these annual studies, yet little good 
came of all this effort.  Many of the 200 school districts were in effect unitary districts, 
with the students attending one school for any grade level or set of grades levels.185  
Others had such a large minority population as to make effective integration impossible 
without consolidation of school districts -- a remedy strongly opposed by the rural 
nature of these districts.186  Still others were under separate court order, effectively out 
                                                                                                                         
they were discriminatory;  (4) to evaluate extra-curricular activities for discriminatory bias;  (5) 
to report discriminatory personnel practices to the commissioner of education;  (6) to review 
annually those districts maintaining campuses with over 66 percent minority enrollment and 
to determine if those schools were in compliance with federal regulations;  (7) to conduct a 
study of minority student needs;  (8) to inform the faculty and staff of grievance and 
complaint procedures.  Id. at 442-49. 
179  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 128. 
180  United States v. Texas, 330 F. Supp. 235, 249-50 (E.D. Tex. 1971);  KEMERER, supra note 
130, at 121. 
181  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 121. 
182  Id. at 128. 
183  Id. at 129. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
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of the reach of the TEA. 187  In other words, of the 200 districts examined yearly by the 
TEA, only about one eighth  to a quarter actually could benefit from state action.188  
Nevertheless, the TEA dutifully continued to do this unnecessary job.  The result was 
wasted resources which could have been better utilized to help the districts that merited 
direction.189 
 
In retrospect the judge realized that placing the TEA in the role of enforcer of the 
Court’s order was a mistake.   
 
I imposed this burden on the Texas Education Agency without any form of 
monitoring because I believed the United States Department of Justice was going to 
stay very active and would perform the monitoring functions themselves.  I 
anticipated that they would have someone down there most of the time checking 
TEA activities to see that the order of the court was complied with.  However, it was 
about that same time that the Nixon administration began, and I noticed immediately 
a significant decline in enforcement activity.  The administration and its Department 
of Justice did not have the same attitude toward school desegregation nor the 
earnestness that the prior administration had.190 
 
Seeking to rectify this mistake, Justice invited a number of Hispanic activist groups to 
appear as plaintiff-intervenor in the case.191  He hoped that they would provide the 
necessary oversight of the TEA’s enforcement activities to assure compliance with the 
law.  The judge was ultimately disappointed in the results, however.  “The actions that 
[these activist groups] have taken through the years have been sporadic;  there has been 
no day-to-day supervision or monitoring of the activities of TEA at all.  Apparently, they 
do not have funds to do that, or even see the need to do so.”192  The result was that by 
1983, despite years of review by the TEA, significant pockets of segregation still 
remained in the Texas schools. 
 
3. Exploring Enforcement Alternatives 
 
The enforcement problems experienced by Judge Justice were not unique to Texas. 
 Finding an effective means of making integration real in both form and effect was 
extremely difficult given the limits of the traditional enforcement tools available to a 
judge.   The judge could make all the orders he wished, but if the various players in a 
                                                 
187  Id. 
188  Id.  Kemerer provides data of this process for 1981.  Of 196 districts above the 66 
percent line, 95 were effective unitary districts, 45 had majority-minority populations, and 30 
were under separate court order.  This left only 26 districts for which annual reports could 
prove useful. 
189  Id. 
190  KEMERER, supra  note 130, at 129-30 (quoting William Wayne Justice). 
191  Id. at 130. 
192  Id. at 129-30 (quoting Justice). 
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dispute chose to ignore these orders, or only provide lip-service, the court’s dictates 
were meaningless: mere words irrelevant to the matters at hand.  Nor was the threat of 
criminal or civil punishment always an adequate means of assuring compliance.  Given 
the public nature of these matters, their extended time frame, the large number of 
people involved, and the general support government officials had in opposing 
integration, threats of punishment were often ignored with impunity.  Even where the 
court backed up its threat of sanctions, this often had the perverse effect of creating 
martyrs and hence more opposition to compliance.193   For integration to work, 
continual, hands-on court oversight was necessary to assure compliance.  Yet, how 
could a court provide such oversight?  The traditional conception of a court’s functions 
involved providing a neutral forum “for settling disputes between private parties about 
private rights.”194   In this context, litigation was by nature simply a dispute between 
clearly identified parties over past events, initiated by the litigants, premised on evidence 
supplied by those parties and providing relief in direct proportion to the substantive 
violation in contention  (i.e. the remedy must be in direct proportion to the specific 
wrong caused by the defendant).195  Yet civil rights suits are nothing like this.   Here, 
the issues in contention involve public policy, not private rights;  the  “party structure is 
sprawling and amorphous,” rather than being clearly delineated;  the issues in contention 
constantly change over the course of the litigation, as opposed to being fixed and 
enduring;  and the remedial process is “suffused and intermixed with negotiating and 
mediat[ion]” rather than providing “one time, authoritative resolution” to wrongs wholly 
committed in the past.196 
 
Civil rights suits, in other words, turn the traditional conception of adjudication on its 
head, making enforcement problematic at best, impossible at worst.  So, what 
enforcement options were available to a judge in such cases?  One answer to this 
dilemma lay in a unique branch of the federal courts’ private law experience:  the 
equity/bankruptcy receivership.197  Prior to the rise of the civil rights suit, questions of 
                                                 
193  See generally Mark G. Yudof, Implementation Theories and Desegregation Realities, 
32 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1981). 
194  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, quoted in AMERICAN 
LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 413 (Lawrence Friedman & 
Harry Scheiber, eds., 1997). 
195  Id. 
196  Chayes, supra  note 194, at 414;  David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: 
Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 
313, 325-28 (1981). 
197  Bankruptcy and equity receiverships are not the same action, but are very similar in 
content and effect.  A bankruptcy court is an equity court and both actions are part of the 
federal courts jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2.  However, bankruptcy requires a congressional statute to be put into force, while 
equity is an inherent part of the federal courts jurisdiction.  Otherwise, bankruptcy and equity 
operate in a similar manner with the receivership function of equity and the trusteeship 
25
Zelden: From Rights to Resources
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
bankruptcy, probate, trusts and creditor’s rights provided some of the most troubling 
and complex issues for the federal courts.198  As would be the case with civil rights 
actions, bankruptcy cases involved conflicting claims from a wide range of  litigants to 
enormous amounts of varied resources.  Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,199 as well 
as general equity jurisdiction, any debtor could request bankruptcy proceedings and the 
appointment of a trustee on an application of insolvency.200  Also, any creditor owed a 
debt four months past due could request an involuntary bankruptcy.  In either case, the 
courts would appoint a trustee or receiver to watch over, and if necessary, operate the 
estate of the bankrupt.  In its earliest forms, such trusteeships/receiverships were only a 
means of maintaining a property before liquidating it; the receiver simply was a 
conservator for the creditors’ interests.  In the late Nineteenth century, however, the 
federal courts, in response to the economic necessity of some forms of property  (such 
as railroads) for economic development, restructured the receivership concept, 
emphasizing reorganization and long-term productivity over immediate disposal of the 
property to pay off creditors.201  This new type of receivership protected the company 
from its creditors, raised new capital through the selling of receiver's bonds and 
generally trimmed the debt that had caused the company to fail in the first place.  The 
end goal of such receiverships was to return the company to its creditors renewed and 
financially sound while providing at all times its necessary economic services to the 
wider community.  The result was to make the federal courts into partners with (or 
perhaps, better stated, guardians of) the failing company, overseeing, in the person of 
                                                                                                                         
function of bankruptcy providing essentially the same services.  Though historically, there 
was a bias in Bankruptcy matters toward dissolution of the company for the benefits of its 
creditors while equity receiverships were used to rebuild the company and return it to its 
stockholders.  However, bankruptcy receiverships could be used to rebuild and return a 
company from the brink of dissolution while equity receiverships could be used to dissolve a 
company where necessary.  See generally Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson, Comment, Equitable 
Remedies:  An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neorecieverships to Implement Large Scale 
Institutional Change, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 1161.  
198  For a discussion of the complexities and the ways federal courts transformed the 
equity receivership in response to such complexities, see Albro Martin, Railroads and the 
Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional Change, 34 J. ECON. HIST’Y 685 (1974); see 
also  Theodore Eisenberg & Stephan C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in 
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 482-86 (1980); Johnson, supra  note 197, at 
1168-69. 
199  11 U.S.C. §§ 61-82 (1898), repealed by § 401(a) of Public Law 95-598. 
200  See generally Charles Thomas Payne, The General Administration of Equity 
Receiverships of Corporations, 31 YALE L.J. 685 (1922);  Warner Fuller, The Background and 
Techniques of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganizations-A Survey, 7 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 375 (1940).  On Bankruptcy, see Graydon Staring, Bankruptcy: An 
Historical View, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1157 (1985); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY (1935). 
201  On evolution of receiverships in 19th century, see generally Payne, supra  note 200;  
FULLER, supra  note 200. 
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the receiver or trustee, the day to day operation of the company for extended periods of 
time.202   
 
To achieve these ends, the federal courts created a series of enforcement tools 
and/or procedures which extended well past the traditional conception of a court’s 
proper role in litigation.  Since economic reorganizations were often long- term 
processes, involving large numbers of litigants and interveners, the courts routinely 
retained jurisdiction in these matters following final judgement.203  Often, this retention 
of jurisdiction was matched with the implementation of a mandatory injunction 
demanding compliance with the Court’s reorganization plan and outlining the penalties 
to be faced for non-compliance.204  This injunction, in turn, was often part of a detailed 
and sweeping decree outlining the basic premises of the reorganization plan (and 
sometimes the very steps to be taken in reorganizing).205   The court then had the 
choice of returning enforcement to those involved  (i.e. using its final decree to set 
policies which a trustee, chosen by the company’s stockholders or creditors, would 
follow in completing the actual reorganization) or of turning to independent experts to 
help in working enforcing remedial plans.206  This latter help usually came in the person 
of a receiver and/or special master appointed directly by the Judge, but could also come 
from expert witnesses and special interveners brought in to help in the formation of 
appropriate decrees, orders and/or oversight of the property.207 
 
What all three types of judicial adjuncts provided was information and expertise.   
                                                 
202  For an additional detailed description of the origins of receiverships as well as a 
discussion of the linkage between bankruptcy receiverships and Civil Rights suits, see 
generally Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra  note 198; Johnson, supra  note 197. 
203  For a detailed description of this process, see Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra  note 198, at 
482-86; Johnson, supra  note 197, at 1168-69. 
204  Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra  note 198, at 482-86; Johnson, supra  note 197, at 1168-69. 
205  Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra  note 198, at 482-86; Johnson, supra  note 197, at 1168-69. 
206  In other words, trustees and receivers had essentially the same roles, the one major 
difference being that the trustee was picked by litigants themselves to watch over the 
reorganization, while receiver was chosen directly by the Judge.  Often, this trustee was 
associated with the management of the company.  Masters, or special masters as they were 
sometimes known, served as the court’s fact-finders: conducting hearings on behalf of the 
court, determining questions of fact and of law, ruling on admissibility of evidence, 
conducting investigations, recommending sanctions and determining the value of property 
and damages.  Often, Masters had the additional job of supervising trustees and receivers, 
reporting to the Judge as appropriate.  Staring, supra  note 200, at 1162; see generally Payne, 
supra  note 200, at 685-701; William O. Douglas & J. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of 
Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestion, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 25 (1932). 
207  Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 
ALA. L. REV. 271, 274 (1981);  Note, Receiverships as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 
RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 132 (1969); Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra  note 198, at 482-86; Johnson, 
supra note 197, at 1168-69.  
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They were the judge’s eyes, ears and hands.  Judges were not businessmen, and they 
did not understand all the ins and outs of operating a particular business.  The detailed 
explanations of the workings of the property provided by these adjuncts enabled the 
judge to make informed decisions.  And, once that decision was made, they were 
available to either carry out or oversee its application. 
 
Once appointed, receivers208 had a wide range of powers and authority over the 
company in receivership.  Oversight of a receiver was often pro-forma.209  Since the 
primary goal of the Court in organizing a receivership was the continuation of bankrupt 
company’s services, not the protection of its creditors, most receivers were given a 
free hand in operating the bankrupt company.210  As early as the 1870s the federal 
courts had ruled that "all outlays of the receiver . . . made in good faith in the ordinary 
course of business . . . and with a view to advance and promote the road . . . are fairly 
within the line of discretion necessarily allowed him."211  Only in cases of 
“extraordinary” expenses would the court examine the receiver's actions.212   As to 
reorganization plans, the court’s oversight was often limited to accepting or denying the 
finished plan.213  Sometimes the courts would appoint a special master to hold hearings 
examining the receiver’s requests to determine what were “ordinary” and what were 
“extraordinary” expenses or actions.214   Yet, in as much as most receivers were 
chosen for the position because of their knowledge and expertise, such requests for 
additional funds or for authority to reorganize procedures were usually granted, as were 
requests for injunctive support.215 
 
This ability to raise new revenue and to reorganize operating procedures was the 
most significant and useful of the receiver’s powers.   Receivers were effectively given 
control of the company (under court supervision) and had full power to hire and fire 
employees, to contract with suppliers and customers, to sell or mortgage portions of 
the company, and to raise new revenues by the issuing of receiver’s certificates.216  For 
                                                 
208  For the purpose of this article, the term receiver will be used to denote receivers, 
masters or trustees unless otherwise noted. 
209  See CHARLES ZELDEN, JUSTICE LIES IN THE DISTRICT  41-45 (1983); Staring, supra  note 
200, at 1162; Douglas & Marshall, supra  note 206, at 25; see generally Payne, supra note 200. 
210  Staring, supra  note 200, at 1162. 
211  Cowdrey v. Railroad, Co., 6 F. Cas., 660, 662 (1870). 
212  Id. 
213  St. Louis Frog and Switch Co. v. St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico R.R., No. 36 (S.D. 
Tex. 1912) (providing an example of this process).  The files in this case fill over 15 storage 
boxes.  Most of these files are made up of reports and requests by the receiver to the Court 
requesting the right to raise money through receiver's bonds or to improve the physical 
condition of the road.  The majority of requests were approved by the Court. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. 
216  See generally Martin, supra  note 198; see also  Payne, supra  note 200, at 685-701; 
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the duration of the receivership, they were the boss, and as such, had full authority to 
construct a reorganization plan to their own specifications (although, once again, under 
direct court supervision and approval of the plan).217  The norm was for receivers to 
work closely with the interested parties, including the stockholders, secured creditors, 
unsecured creditors, employees and state government officials.218  But, all these 
interests were explicitly subordinate to the needs of the wider community.219    As 
Judge Waller T. Burns of the Southern District of Texas noted in a 1915, where the 
property in receivership “was in bad shape, creditors ha[d] no reasonable grounds to 
expect an early adjustment of their accounts,” until every effort had been “made by the 
Receiver, under the direction of the Court, to put the property in such shape as to 
permit its operation.”
220  Only after the public's interest had been served and continued 
service was assured was the court to concern itself with creditors' rights.221  
 
It was to these enforcement procedures that the district Courts turned to in response 
to the Supreme Court’s demand for action in 1968.  Brown II222 had noted that civil 
rights cases “call for the exercise of . . . traditional attributes of equity power”;223 
Green224 made clear the High Court’s commitment to change.  With little time or 
discretion in these matters, the district judges (who, we should recall, were not overly 
enthused with the job) turned to the familiar equity procedures of the past for guidance 
and found the receivership model applicable in constructing remedies to enforcement 
problems.   “The comprehensive remedial decrees” for civil rights matters, notes Judge 
Frank M. Johnson, Jr. of the middle District of Alabama and later the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, “presents no more than the use of conventual judicial tools for dealing 
with complexity and intransigence in an unconventual setting”225  Legal scholars 
Theodore Eisneberg and Stephen Yeazell agree, noting how “what is said to be new in 
                                                                                                                         
Fuller, supra  note 200, at 377-92. 
217  See St. Louis Frog, No. 36, (S.D. Tex., 1912); see also  ZELDEN, supra  note 209. 
218  See generally Martin, supra  note 198; see also  Payne, supra  note 200, at 685-701;  
Fuller, supra  note 200, at 377-92. 
219  Fuller, supra  note 219, at 382-92. 
220  Letter from Waller T. Burns, Judge of the Southern District of Texas, Letters, to 
Southwestern Mercantile Agency, vol. 5, no. 2, at 239 (Apr. 19, 1915) (to be archived in the 
University of Texas Law Library).  See also  Farmers Grain Co. v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 66 F. 
Supp 845, 858 (1946), rev’d, 158 F.2d 109 (1946), vacated, 332 U.S. 748 (1947) (“the interests of 
the public and the duty of the carrier to continue to provide transportation are given 
precedence over the interests of secured and unsecured creditors . . . and stockholders . . . . 
[T]he public’s right in the matter has always been preferred to the property rights of all other 
persons.”). 
221  Farmers Grain, 66 F. Supp. at 858. 
222  349 U.S. 294. 
223  Id. at 300. 
224  391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
225  Johnson, supra  note 197, at 274. 
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these cases [civil rights suits] is really only a response to the problems of intransigence 
and complexity that the law had dealt with in ‘extraordinary’ ways for centuries.”226  
This “extraordinary” way, in turn, was the equity receivership and its enforcement 
corollaries.227 
 
Viewed from this perspective, United States v. Texas228 exemplifies one of the 
receivership model’s basic mechanisms: the appointment of receivers or other experts 
to act as the court’s eyes, ears and hands (first the use of the TEA and later the 
Hispanic political reform groups) to assure compliance with the court’s orders.  
Though this process did not work as planed, it does show the method that would be 
used with greater effect in other cases.  (It also shows the inherent dangers in such 
appointments.  For the receivership process to work, the receiver had to act in good 
faith and with positive effect).    
 
An example of a case in which the process worked as planned was the 1965 case of 
Turner v. Goolsby.229  In this Southern District of Georgia case, the Talioferro County 
School Board had circumvented a court-ordered desegregation plan to integrate the 
district’s two segregated schools by closing the white-only school and busing the white 
students to schools in adjoining counties.230   The Court responded with an order to halt 
this practice.231  The school board resisted.232  Realizing that an injunction alone would 
not force compliance and thus resolve the dispute, the Court turned to alternate 
enforcement methods.233 As the three-judge panel noted, “in order to avoid irreparable 
injury to the white children which would result from enjoining the use of public funds 
for their education, and to preserve the rights of 87 Negro applicants for transfer, the 
[District] Court . . . concluded that in the exercise of its equity power it will be 
necessary to place the school system of Taliaferro County in receivership.”234  To this 
end, the three judge panel hearing this case appointed the state superintendent of 
schools as receiver with instructions to submit a remedial plan that would assure 
compliance with the court’s desegregation order.235  The state official quickly 
complied.  Entering into negotiations with the various school districts involved in this 
case, the receiver convinced the surrounding school districts where the white students 
of Talioferro County were attending to accept the county’s black students as well.236  
                                                 
226  Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra  note 198, at 491. 
227  Id. 
228  United States  v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970). 
229  255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966). 
230  Id. at 730. 
231  Id. 
232  Id. 
233  Id. 
234  Id. 
235  Id. 
236  Id. at 733. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/2
1999] FROM RIGHTS TO RESOURCES 
He then made sure that the buses used to transport the children, and the facilities in 
these other districts, were desegregated.237  The initial problem solved, the receiver was 
then directed to investigate longer-term problems.  These included academic outcomes 
(black students from Talioferro county were failing in the adjoining county schools) and 
the desegregation of the Talioferro county schools (the adjoining county schools had 
made clear their refusal to accept any Talioferro students in subsequent years).238  The 
receiver responded to the outcomes problem by first investigating the usefulness of 
remedial instruction, and then, by exploring the means available to fund such 
instruction.  In as much as the state had no funds for remedial instruction (and as the 
state superintendent of schools he knew this), his response was to produce and submit 
a court plan to the Department of Health, Welfare and Education for federal funding.239 
 On the greater problem of desegregation, the receiver worked with the board of 
education to produce a desegregation plan that was acceptable to all parties.240  At this 
time, he reported his successes back to the court and was dismissed from his 
position.241 
 
State officials were not the only source of receivers.  Another option was to use the 
Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare.  Under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,242 the HEW was given the job of policing the desegregation process of southern 
schools.243  Title VI of the Act authorized the HEW to deny federal funds to any school 
maintaining a dual education system.244  At the urging of President Johnson, HEW 
officials promptly sought to fulfill this function, issuing in December 1964 an order to 
all southern school districts to submit desegregation plans or forfeit their federal 
funding.245  Four months later, the HEW issued guidelines for districts to follow in 
drafting these plans;  in 1966 and 1968, ever more stringent guidelines were 
announced.246  The result was to make the HEW a force in almost every southern 
school desegregation case. 247  It also meant that guidelines were available to the courts 
                                                 
237  Id. 
238  Id. at 733-34. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. at 734-35. 
241  Id. at 735. 
242  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a-h-6 (1994)). 
243  Id. 
244  42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). 
245  45 C.F.R. § 80 (1973); see also  Mark Chadsey, Federal Courts and Southern School 
Desegregation:  The Courts Lead A Social Change 113-20 (1996) (unpublished Ph. D. 
Dissertation, S.U.N.Y. Buffalo) (on file with UMI Dissertation Services). 
246  Chadsey, supra  note 245, at 113 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 80; 45 C.F.R. § 181 (1966)).  The 1968 
Guidelines, titled “Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance With Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” are found in 33 Fed. Reg. 4955 (1968).  
247  See generally James R. Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in 
the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967); Comment, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School 
Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967).  Chadsey argues that the role of the HEW in 
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in defining acceptable integration plans.248     
It was an availability that many courts chose to make use of.  In Wittenberg v. 
Greenville County School District,249 a 1969 case involving some twenty-two South 
Carolina school districts, a special four-judge panel faced “the task of fashioning 
decrees that will assure compliance by the school districts with the applicable 
constitutional standards.”250  The problem, the Court noted, was that the districts varied 
so widely as to size, make-up and racial composition, that they did not “lend themselves 
to a uniform type of decree.”251  The Court’s answer was to turn to the HEW for help 
in finding site appropriate remedies.   
 
The difficulties involved in developing a proper decree concern . . . practical 
operational question and matters of educational administration.   H. E. W., with 
its staff of trained educational experts ‘with their day-to-day experiences with 
thousands of school systems,’ is far better qualified to deal with such . . . 
problems than the Courts presided over by Judges, who, as one Court has 
phrased it, ‘do not have sufficient competence -- they are not educators or 
school administrators -- to know the right questions, much less the right 
answers’252 
 
At the least, the Court went on to note, “it would seem H. E. W. should be solicited 
by the Courts to provide expert advice and guidance in determining applicable standards 
and in passing on the adequacy of the desegregation plans submitted by the defendant 
school districts.”253   From such cooperation, “a greater approximation of uniformity 
and equality of treatment in plans of desegregation among similar school districts in a 
State would be possible.”254   To this end, the judges ordered the defendant school 
districts to “promptly submit” to the HEW a report listing their “existing methods of 
operation,” as well as their thoughts on ways to desegregating their schools.255  They 
were then to “seek, within 30 days, to develop, in conjunction with the experts of 
[HEW], an acceptable plan of operation, conformable to the constitutional rights of the 
plaintiffs . . . and consonant in timing and method with the practical and administrative 
problems faced by the particular district.”256  If this plan could be developed to the 
                                                                                                                         
promoting school desegregation has been over-emphasized at the expense of the effect that 
district court rulings had in shaping the desegregation process.  Chadsey, supra  note 245, at 
104-13. 
248  Chadsey, supra  note 245, at 104-13. 
249  98 F. Supp. 784 (D. S.C. 1969). 
250  Id. at 788. 
251  Id. at 790-91. 
252  Id. at 790 (quoting United States v. Jefferson, 372 F. 2d 836, 855 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
253  Whittenberg , 298 F. Supp. at 790. 
254  Id. 
255  Id. 
256  Id. 
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satisfaction of the HEW within thirty days, “such plan shall be adopted as the decree of 
this Court.”257  If no plan acceptable to the HEW was adopted, the HEW was 
“requested to submit promptly its [own] recommendation of an acceptable plan for the 
school district in question.”258  And, “absent some special showing by the parties” as to 
the plan’s “constitutional infirmity,” the Court would then “proceed without further 
hearing to enter its decree” based on this plan as amended by the suggestions of the 
defendants and plaintiffs.259 
 
In United States v. Watson Chapel School District No. 24,260 a 1970 case arising out 
of the Eastern District of Arkansas, Judge Oren Harris turned to an HEW integration 
plan in response to the School District’s repeated refusal to come up with a workable 
alternative of its own.261  In fact, rather than come up with a plan that met the 
Constitutional requirement to produce a unitary system, the Board had simply objected, 
and objected, and objected once again, to both the integration order and the HEW 
plan.262  Their reasoning:  a stated belief that “there is no constitutional requirement for 
race mixing.”263   Hence, though he waited “patiently and painstakingly” for the school 
board to change its attitude, ultimately, the judge was forced to act: “The school district 
has failed and refused to present a plan reasonably expected to comply with the law.”264 
 This left “the Court [with] no alternative at this late date but to require the school 
district to operate under a lawful system.”265  To this end, the Court, after considering 
“the two plans recommended by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as 
well as other alternatives,” concluded that the HEW plans “offer[ed] a more reasonable 
and adequate solution to the school’s needs and the requirements for a unitary system 
as required by law.”266  On appeal, the Eight Circuit endorsed the use of the HEW 
plans.267 
 
Other cases where the courts chose to make use of the HEW’s services included: 
the 1969 case of Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education,268 where a Middle 
District of Alabama judge approved a desegregation plan for neighborhood zoning of 
                                                 
257  Id. at 790-91. 
258  Id. at 791. 
259  Id. 
260  The District Court’s judgement in this case was not published.  All information and 
quotes come from United States v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 446 F. 2d. 933 (8th Cir. 1971). 
261  Id. at 935. 
262  Id. 
263  Id. 
264  Id. 
265  Id.  
266  Id. at 935.  
267  Id. at 937. 
268  No. 29,521 (5th Cir. June 29, 1970), noted in 2 RACE REL. L. SURV. 92, 92 (1970) (appeal to 
the Fifth Circuit). 
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schools matched with the pairing of city and rural schools proposed by the Board, but 
constructed in cooperation with the HEW.”269  Later that year, the same court, in the 
case of Lee v. Macon County Board of Education,270 ordered the Justice Department, 
as intervener-plaintiff, to have the HEW study the problem and make recommendations 
to help the school board arrive at a workable plan.271  Should the subsequent plan be 
deemed unable to “realistically and effectively disestablish the dual system based on 
race,” Judge Frank Johnson concluded, the HEW was to submit its own plan.272  
Meanwhile, in 1971, Judge Bulter of the Eastern District of North Carolina named the 
HEW as “its consultant” with the job of developing a desegregation plan “in cooperation 
with the school board’s administrative staff.”273  When the Board objected to the plan 
submitted by the HEW, the court directed the Board to implement the HEW plan.274 
 
The availability of the HEW to serve the receiver function proved fortuitous for the 
district courts.  In using HEW guidelines, judges were finally able to share “the 
nettlesome school problem, to be freer of the weary load, so complex and controversial, 
that Brown II had assigned them.”275   More importantly, their use pointed to the 
primary reason for turning to the receivership model in the first place: the ongoing and 
complex nature of such cases.  It was with this in mind that the Fifth Circuit in 
Jefferson276 had recommended that, as judges were “not educators or school 
administrators,” and thus lacked “sufficient competence  . . . to know the right 
question, much less the right answers” in these matters, “courts in this circuit should 
give great weight to future HEW Guidelines.”277  The result was that HEW guidelines 
served as the foundation of desegregation plans across the south.278   
 
Of course, not all judges chose to make use of State Officials or the HEW.  Other 
options were available.  In Lee v. Macon County Board of Education,279 Judge Frank 
Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama, in addition to seeking the help of the HEW, 
turned regularly to the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division to fill aspects of the 
receiver role.  A large and complex case, Lee involved the desegregation of almost all of 
the state’s school systems.280  Adopted in response to the continual opposition to his 
desegregation orders by Alabama Governor George Wallace, and the subsequent lack of 
                                                 
269  2 RACE REL. L. SURV. at 92. 
270  No. 604-E (M.D. Ala. Oct. 23, 1969), noted in 1 RACE REL. L. SURV. 204-05 (1970). 
271  1 RACE REL. L. SURV. at 204-05. 
272  Id. 
273  Eaton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 78, 78 (E.D. N.C. 1971). 
274  Id. at 79-80. 
275  WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 107. 
276  United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. 2d 836, 855 (5th Cir. 1966). 
277  Id. at 847, 855, 858. 
278  See Comment, supra  note 247, at 349-50.  
279  292 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
280  Id. at 363; see also  JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM 229-30 (1993).  
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integration in the state, the judgment required a “uniform state-wide plan for school 
desegregation” for every school district not already under the a court order.281  Given 
the overwhelming nature of this task (Judge Johnson would subsequently spend much 
of his time for the next year and a half in implementing this order)282 the Judge turned 
to the Civil Rights Division’s head, John Doar, for help in constructing, implementing 
and enforcing the integration plans.  “I think John Doar, speaking for the civil rights 
division on the Department of Justice, had a special role in Frank Johnson’s 
courtroom,” writes Owen Fiss, aid to Doar at that time.283  “Judge Johnson . . . invited 
the Department of Justice in because he wanted a lawyer in that case he could have 
total confidence in -- someone that would be a friend of the court, who could advise the 
court.”284   Johnson did this, Fiss holds, in large part out of a high respect for Doar.  
“There was something like total respect for each other, total confidence.”285    Yet, the 
Judge also did this because, if such a large integration plan were to work, he needed 
“information on what [was] going to effectively desegregate the schools. . . a kind of 
technocratic advice on what was needed to get the job done” as well as a “kind of 
factual justification for what [he] was doing.”286  This was exactly the service provided 
by the federal lawyers.  “When we finished trying one of these cases, Judge Johnson 
had the sort of factual predicate -- or basis -- to exercise coercive power.”287  As a 
result, “most of the witnesses, most of the information, most of the discovery was 
always done by the Department of Justice.”288 
 
In Jacksonville, Florida, Judge Bryan Simpson turned to a university research center 
for help.  This case, that of Mims v. Duval County School Board,289 posed the usual 
enforcement problems for a desegregation suit.  In 1960 Judge Simpson had ordered 
the school board to produce a desegregation plan;  the board had returned in 1963 with 
a combined stair-step/freedom-of-choice program which the judge quickly approved.290 
 Progress, however, proved very slow.  In March of 1965, out of a total of about 
30,000 black students in the Jacksonville-Duval County school district, only some sixty 
black children were attending integrated schools.291  A modification of the 
desegregation plan, adopted at that time to speed up the process, proved ineffective.292  
                                                 
281  Lee, 292 F. Supp. at 365-67.  
282  BASS, supra  note 280, at 229-30. 
283  Id. at 232 (quoting Owen Fiss). 
284  Id. at 233. 
285  Id. at 232. 
286  Id. at 233-34. 
287  Id. at 234. 
288  Id. 
289  329 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Fla. 1971), aff’d, 447 F. 2d. 1330 (5th Cir. 1971). 
290  Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 126.  For background to this case, see FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. 
MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED 510-21 (1978). 
291  Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 126. 
292  Id. at 126-27. 
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By 1967, Simpson had had enough.  Convinced that the board was purposely holding 
up the integration process by a mix of racial gerrymandering and transfer politics 
(refusing black transfers to white schools while allowing white transfers from 
integrated schools to white-only schools), and further that the board was either 
unwilling or incapable of producing an effective integration plan, the Judge requested 
the help of the South Florida Desegregation Center of the University of Miami.293  In 
January 1969, the Center submitted its report which became the foundation of a new 
integration plan.294  At this time, Judge Simpson moved up to the Fifth Circuit.  He was 
replaced in 1970 by William McRae, Jr., who, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
Green295 and Carter296 decisions, as well as that in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education,297 ordered the school superintendent to seek further assistance 
from the School Desegregation Center.298  The matter finally came to a head in May of 
1971, when a third judge, Gerald B. Tjoflat, brought all the pieces together and imposed 
his own plan, one based, in part, on the proposals of the Desegregation Center.299 
 
Another option available to judges in using the receivership model as a guide to 
action was to name the school board as trustee for itself.  In cases of this sort, the 
Court would chose the implantation methods, set this policy with its judgement, and 
then leave it to the board to implement this policy under court supervision.300  The most 
effective way to do this, and the judges preference in these matters, was for the board 
to come up with a workable plan on its own which the Court would then approve.301   
For, as judge after judge would note in their opinions, the burden in coming up with a 
desegregation plan lay first and foremost with the school board itself:  “before 
considering any other desegregation plan, it is incumbent upon the court to examine 
proposal of the school board, and if that plan meets constitutional requirements, the 
court should look no further.”302  Where the school board fulfilled this burden, the 
                                                 
293  Id. at 127-28. 
294  Id. at 129. 
295  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
296  Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd. 396 U.S. 290 (1970). 
297  402 U.S. 1 (1970). 
298  Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 129-30. 
299  Mims v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 338 F. Supp. 1208, 1209-10 (M.D. Fla. 1972).  The 
South Florida Desegregation Center was also used (in conjunction with the HEW) in Pate v. 
Dade County Sch. Bd., 315 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d and modified, 434 F.2d 1151 (5th 
Cir. 1970).  Another similar option was the use of private corporations specializing in 
desegregation matters.  See Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 1034 (D. Md. 1972). 
300  E.g. Yarbrough v. Hulbert-West Memphis Sch. Dist., 329 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Ark. 
1971); Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish Sch. Bd., 315 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. La. 1970), vacated, 
446 F.2d 266 (1971). 
301  Gordon, 315 F. Supp. at 901 n.1 (noting “federal courts have long recognized that they 
should not endeavor to devise plans for desegregation for any school district when, as here, 
the School Board presents a feasible plan that works.”). 
302  Yarbrough, 329 F. Supp. at 1064. 
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courts were very happy to provide formal approval and support.  Of course, not many 
school boards chose to abide by their constitutional burden in these matters and so the 
courts were forced to take more precipitous action.   
 
It was here that many judges turned to alternative sources for integration plans.  
This process could be done in any number of different ways.  The court could turn to 
various types of receivers as described above and below.303  It could also turn to the 
plaintiffs or various interveners for proposals, choosing among the many options for the 
best possible mix of methods.304  A third option involved mandatory injunctions, often 
mixed with suggestions, ordering the board to come up with a workable plan.305  And, 
of course, the judge could simply come up with a plan on his own.306   
 
Whatever the source, at some point, the court would choose a plan and issue a 
decree requiring the school board to implement said plan.  Once again, where the school 
board chooses to abide by its constitutional duty, the court could allow the issue to rest, 
trusting to the plaintiffs to bring any occasional violations to the court’s attention.  
Where the board had already proven intransigent, however, judges usually felt it 
necessary to initiate more stringent oversight.  While this could mean nothing more than 
requiring annual or bi-annual reports from the school board,307 a more common method 
of enforcement (and one drawing noticeably from the courts’ experience in business 
receiverships) was the creation of bi-racial committees charged with the supervision of 
the plan to fill the special master function of the receivership model.  
 
In Miami Florida, for example, after choosing a desegregation plan from a long list 
of proposed plans, Judge Atkins ordered the creation of a “Bi-Racial Committee 
composed of 12 members, six White and six Black, . . . [to] review the operation of the 
majority to minority pupil transfer rule, the transportation system, selection of school 
sites, and such other special assignments as the Court may direct.”308  To this end, the 
                                                 
303  See supra note 222 through infra note 328 and accompanying text. 
304  An example of a how many options were available to a judge is  Pate, 315 F. Supp. at 
1161-66.  In this one case there were three major and three minor plans proposed to the court.  
The major plans included one by School Board, by HEW, and by the Dade County Classroom 
Teachers’ Association (CTA).  The minor plans included proposals by the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Governor of Florida along with the local Congressmen, and a plan 
proposed by a parents group (The Ring-Horwich Plan).  The Court’s final decree was a mix of 
the three major plans with small adjustments from the minor plans. 
305  E.g., Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 332 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. La. 1971), aff’d, 456 
F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). 
306  E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. N.C. 1970), 
vacated, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
307  See Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 953 (N.D. Tex.1971), aff’d, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 
1978), vacated, 651 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981). 
308  Pate v. County Sch. Bd., 315 F. Supp. 1161, 1174 (S.D. Fla. 1970). 
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Committee was “authorized to hold hearings and make recommendations to the Board in 
connection with these activities.”309  In Atlanta, a three-judge panel matched the 
creation of a bi-racial committee with an order to the litigants to “first present to [the 
committee] any disagreement regarding the operation of this order prior to filing a 
motion with the Court.310  Meanwhile, in Dallas, Judge William Taylor, Jr. created a 
Tri-Ethnic Committee to deal with the problems posed by the City’s large Hispanic and 
black populations.311  Charged with the oversight of transportation systems, teacher 
assignments, student transfers and the selection of school sites, the Committee was to 
report monthly and be given “adequate office space . . . in the federal building” while 
the school board “provide[d] sufficient funds for the employment of two secretaries . . 
. and appropriate office equipment and supplies.”312  A similar tri-ethnic committee was 
created in Corpus Christi as well.313   
 
A final option available to district judges, and the one closest to the origins of the 
receivership model, was to appoint independent experts as receivers.  In the initial steps 
of the landmark case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,314 for 
example, rather than turn to a state or federal official, Judge James B. McMillan turned 
to an outside expert, Dr. John A. Finger of Rhode Island College, as receiver.315   He 
did this  in response to the repeated refusal of the School Board to produce a plan that 
met the immediate integration standards set by the Supreme Court in Green.316  “I asked 
the School Board to make those changes on their own,” the judge later noted in a 1981 
Senate hearing on school busing, “they declined.”317  In fact, Judge McMillan made 
repeated requests to the School Board to work with him in producing a viable plan.  
And each time the board declined the invitation.318   Dr. Finger, who had originally 
come before the Court as a witness for the plaintiffs,319 responded to his commission 
                                                 
309  Id. 
310  Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
311  Tasby, 342 F. Supp. at 953. 
312  Id. 
313  Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 330 F. Supp 1377 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff’d, 
modified and remanded, 467 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1971).  On the tri-ethnic committee, see Mary 
Alice Davis, Cox Modifies Computer Plan, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER, July 30, 1970, at A1. 
314  311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. N.C. 1970), vacated, 431 F. 2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff’d in part, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
315  Swann, 311 F. Supp. at 266-67, 269.  In his judgement, Judge McMillan called Dr. Finger 
an “expert.”  Id. at 269.  But Finger’s powers and actions were that of a receiver. 
316  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
317  Court-Ordered School Busing: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Separation of 
Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Sess., 
529, quoted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN’S WAY (1986). 
318  Id. 
319  Judge McMillan’s use of a plaintiff’s witness as receiver proved controversial.  On 
appeal the Fifth Circuit would caution “that when a court needs and expert, it should avoid 
appointing a person who has appeared as a witness for one of the parties.”  Swann, 431 F. 2d 
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with a comprehensive integration plan shaped to deal with the district’s enforcement 
problems.320  In particular, he turned to the then unused option of mandatory busing.321 
    
The same pattern followed one year later, when a Northern District of Mississippi 
judge turned to an independent expert in a suit to desegregate the Indianola Municipal 
School District.322  The appointment of an independent receiver had not been the 
judge’s first choice.  In January 1970, the judge, under pressure from the Fifth 
Circuit,323 had ordered the school board to adopt and implement an HEW integration 
plan.324  The school board countered with a motion that under this plan “this defendant 
school district will remain an all Negro district and the effectiveness of the school 
district will be destroyed. . . .”325 They requested, therefore, the appointment of a 
special master to study the matter and submit a new plan for the upcoming school 
year.326  The judge responded by appointing Dr. James McCullough, of the Mississippi 
State University faculty, as Special Master with the task of making “a full study” and all 
“proper recommendations” for the desegregation of all grades by the 1970-1971 school 
year.327 
 
Still another case where outside receivers were appointed involved the 1971 
integration of the Augusta Georgia schools.328  Faced with obstructionism from the 
school board, and not receiving the help he expected from the HEW or the Justice 
Department (under President Nixon, both the HEW and the Justice Department backed 
away from aggressively promoting integration),329 Judge Alexander Lawrence of the 
Southern District of Georgia turned to two independent experts to serve as receivers.330 
 Their job was to produce an integration plan that met all Supreme Court directives and 
                                                                                                                         
at 148.  The Supreme Court would second this view.  In neither case, however, would this 
matter affect the final outcome of the case, which was ultimately upheld by the Supreme 
Court.  Swann, 402 U.S. at 31.  Judge Mcmillan’s explanation for why he appointed Finger was 
the difficulty of finding an expert from the local community who would accept the 
appointment in the face of community objections.  SCHWARTZ, supra  note 317, at 17-18. 
320  Swann, 311 F. Supp. 266-67. 
321  Id. at 268. 
322  Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., No. GC 6637-K (N. D. Miss. Mar. 30, 1970), noted 
in 2 RACE REL. L. SURV. 56, 56-7 (1970).  
323  See United States v. Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969). 
324  2 RACE REL. L. SURV. at 57 (1970). 
325  Id. 
326  Id. 
327  Id. 
328  Acree v. Drummond, 336 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Ga. 1972), modified, 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
329  Acree, 336 F. Supp. at 1278; see also  Chadsey, supra  note 245, at 212-220 (discussing 
HEWs shift in policy after 1969). 
330  Acree, 336 F. Supp. at 1278. 
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the particular needs of the Augusta schools.331  Appointed in August, 1971, the two 
receivers quickly came up with a plan which they presented to the court in October of 
1971.332  After an extension to allow the interested parties one last chance to come up 
with their own plan, and the failure of those parties to act on this chance, the Court 
approved the receivers’ plan in January, 1972.333   
 
Rare at first, the use of receivers or other court appointed adjuncts to investigate, 
create and/or enforce integration orders had become common in the South by 1971 --  
especially when one adds in the number of cases where the judge issued a detailed 
decree and then forced the defendant school board to act as its own trustee in enforcing 
the court order.   This number would only increase as integration continued apace in the 
South and moved into the large urban school districts of the North.334  The result was 
to make the receivership model a foundation for the federal courts’ integration efforts.   
 
4. The Troubling Problem Of Color:  The Shift To Color-Conscious Remedies 
 
Whatever its particular form, the wide application of the receivership model for 
enforcement in integration cases proved to be a momentous decision.  The pairing of 
mandatory injunctions and sweeping decrees with the appointment of receivers, 
trustees, special masters  and/or bi-racial committees, gave the district courts the tools 
necessary to overcome the opposition, obstructionism and complexity which to date 
had undercut the effectiveness of desegregation decisions.  By bringing the expertise 
and coercive powers of a court, and its agent the receiver, to bare on these matters, the 
federal courts finally had the ability to make integration a real (if not always fully 
realized) proposition.  By 1972 the South, at forty-six percent, was the most integrated 
region in the nation.335  It would continue to be so throughout the decade.336 
 
                                                 
331  Id. 
332  Id. 
333  Id. at 1280, 1286-87. 
334  Though the application of the receivership model began in the South, it would be 
northern districts which, faced with the greater complexity posed by such enormous and 
diverse urban districts (and with the South’s experiences as a guide), would bring the school 
receivership to its full potential.  A discussion of this process is beyond the scope of this 
work.  For a discussion of northern receiverships, see Kirp & Babcock, supra  note 196, at 325-
97 (discussing six northern integration suits, all involving the use of special masters).  An 
example of the continuation of Southern receiverships is United States v. Texas Education 
Agency, where the Fifth Circuit proposed to a district court that it should “consider 
appointing a master to prepare a comprehensive school desegregation plan.”  532 F. 2d 380, 
399 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).  The District Judge heeded the call, appointing 
a master who produced a plan. 
335  School Desegregation Statistics, RACE REL. REP., quoted in ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE 
UNRAVELING OF AMERICA 193 (1984). 
336  Id. 
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There was, however, one unintended consequence to applying the receivership 
model to civil rights matters, one that related directly to the methods chosen to 
desegregate dual school districts.  School cases posed two pressing problems that had 
to be solved if integration were to be a reality:  (1) the problem of how much race 
mixing was necessary to produce a unitary school district;  (2) who to move, and in 
what manner, to achieve this proper mix.  As noted above, integration cases were 
normally big, complex and difficult for the district courts to handle.  Even where the 
judge was ready to take the heat of a decision for immediate integration, implementing a 
plan that met Supreme Court directives, plaintiff’s demands, defendant’s fears and the 
never to be forgotten need to provide a quality education for all the students was simply 
a difficult proposition.   
 
The receivership model offered an answer to these problems.  One of the ways that 
traditional receiverships had dealt with the complex issues posed by a bankruptcy 
reorganization was by simplifying its relations with those who had a claim on the 
company’s assets (creditors, stockholders, employees).337  The problem was that each 
of these players had their own specific, and competing, claims;  if the receiver were to 
deal with each claimant’s needs on an individual basis nothing would ever get done.338  
To rectify this matter, receivers grouped claimants by the nature of their claims on the 
company.339  That is to say, stockholders were treated as a single group;  so too 
employees, etc.  With creditors, who usually made up the most numerous of claimants, 
the receiver would take the classification scheme ever further, categorizing the creditors 
by the nature of the debts owed to them.   In this way, those holding a mortgage to the 
company would be separated out from more common bond holders, who would in turn 
be categorized separately from unsecured creditors (suppliers and service providers).340  
 
The effect of such categorization was to impose a group, as opposed to individual, 
perspective in these matters.  This shift proved significant, since which category you 
were placed in affected your respective rights to the company’s assets.  In 1913, the 
Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd341 had held that the respective 
claims to a company’s assets must be ranked as to their proper order of priority.342  
Participation in the reorganized company, in turn, would be distributed to claimants in 
descending order based on those priorities.343  When the assets were fully distributed, 
                                                 
337  See Payne, supra  note 200, at 689-93. 
338  Id. 
339  Id. 
340  Id. 
341  228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
342  Id. at 504-05.  
343  Id. at 508.  This doctrine was reinforced by the Supreme Court in the 1939 case of Case 
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-22 (1939); see also  Walter J. Blum & 
Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 651, 654-55 (1974). 
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the process ended, even if some lower ranked claimants received nothing.344  This 
meant that it did not matter if you had one share or one thousand in terms of how the 
receiver viewed your rights in these matters, you  were treated the same.  More 
significantly, it meant that a bond holder owed $100 had a greater claim on the receiver 
for action than an unsecured creditor owed $10,000.  The individual’s particular needs 
were subordinated to the group’s, and the remedies provided were aimed at meeting the 
group’s general needs and rights -- even where, on an individual basis, this produced an 
injustice. 
 
Applied to civil rights, this group perspective lent itself to the shift from color-blind 
(i.e. individual) remedies to race-based (i.e. group) remedies.  Circuit Judge John Minor 
Wisdom had pointed the way toward race-conscience enforcement of the equal 
protection clause in Jefferson I:345  
 
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious.  To avoid conflict 
with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes 
harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race.  In that sense, the 
Constitution is color blind.  But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent 
discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination. 
 The criterion is the relevancy of color to a legitimate government purpose.346 
 
In order to make integration work, in other words, the courts would have to 
recognize and apply race in constructing remedies.  Yet to do so on an individual basis 
was an enormous task:  deciding that for student A, race was an issue, while for 
student B, it was not, was difficult;  doing so for each of tens of thousands of students, 
was impossible.  Yet race-based remedies were clearly called for if the Supreme 
Court’s directives were to be met.  It was in attempting to deal with this dilemma that 
district Judges turned to the method of group-based remedies inherent in the 
receivership model -- in particular, the application of specific ratios and quotas matched 
with mandatory busing (or other extreme measures) in faculty hiring, facilities 
construction and student transfers as the means of shifting these bodies around. 
 
Take, for example, the issue of faculty integration.  Prior to Brown,347 teachers were 
as segregated by race as their students.348  It therefore followed that when the courts 
                                                 
344  Blum & Kaplan, supra  note 343, at 654-55. 
345  372 F. 2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). 
346  Id. at  876. 
347  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
348  E.g., Macklin v. County Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 4392 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 1966), noted 
in 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 805, 805-06 (1966); Thompson v. County Sch. Bd., Civ. No. 4274 (E.D. 
Va. Apr. 22, 1966), noted in 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1311, 1311-14 (1966); Turner v. County Sch. 
Bd., Civ. No. 4343 (E.D. Va. May 4, 1966), noted in 11 Race REL. L. REP. 1314, 1314-15 (1966); 
Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., Civ. No. 16173-F (E.D. La. July 27, 1967), noted in 12 RACE 
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ordered student integration, they would order the same for teachers and staff.  This, in 
fact, was what many district courts did.  Yet problems quickly arose.  Few school 
districts wanted any form of integration.  For many whites, the thought of black 
teachers teaching white students was horrific.349  Opposition to teacher integration 
therefore proved as strong as that for students.  Yet, in many ways, the issue of faculty 
integration was the easier problem to solve;  the numbers were smaller, and the 
problems associated with moving students between schools did not exist here.  Still, 
despite this greater facility for integration, few school districts sought to integrate 
teachers.  Many sought to delay as long as possible.350  This obstructionism forced 
district judges to respond in new ways.  And for many judges, this new way was to set 
explicit faculty integration goals based on the districts ratio of white to black teachers. 
 
The landmark case in this matter was Carr v. Montgomery County Board of 
Education.351  Argued before Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., the case began in 1964 
with an order to the school board to adopt a desegregation plan for both students and 
faculty.352  In regards to faculty integration, the order read that: 
 
Race or color will henceforth not be a factor in hiring, assignment, reassignment, 
promotion, demotion, or dismissal of teachers and other professional staff, with the 
exception that assignments shall be made in order to eliminate the effects of past 
discrimination.  Teachers, principals, and staff members will be assigned to schools 
so that the faculty and staff is not composed of members of one race.353   
 
It went on to order the “Superintendent of Schools and his staff” to “take affirmative 
steps to solicit and encourage teachers presently employed  to accept transfers to 
schools in which the majority of the faculty members are of a race different from that 
of the teacher transferred” beginning in September 1967.354  Progress proved very 
slow, however.  As of February 1968, only thirty-two teachers were “teaching pupils in 
schools that were predominantly of the opposite race.” This, out of a pool of some 550 
                                                                                                                         
REL. L. REP. 1279, 1279-80 (1967); August v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction (N.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 1967), 
noted in 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 796, 796-97 (1967). 
349  See Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d, 
400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), rev’d, 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (providing an example of parent opposition 
to integrated faculties). 
350  E.g., id.; Conley v. Lake Charles Sch. Bd., 314 F. Supp 1282 (W.D. La. 1970), rev’d in 
part and aff’d in part, 434 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1970); Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 
273 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. N.C. 1967), aff’d, 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1968); Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. 
Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1973); see also  Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F. 2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970); United 
States v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 494 F. 2d. 575 (5th Cir. 1974). 
351  289 F. Supp 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), reh’g denied, 402 F.2d 
782 (5th Cir. 1968), rev’d, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). 
352  Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 253 F. Supp. 306, 307 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
353  Id. at 310. 
354  Id. 
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black and 815 white teachers. 355  Most of this movement, in turn, took place in the 
limited environment of the high schools and within the City of Montgomery.356  As for 
new hires, since the 1967 order the district had hired thirty-two new teachers, twenty-
six white and six black.357  Of this number, twenty of the white teachers were 
appointed to white majority schools while all of the black teachers were assigned to 
those where blacks were the majority.358  The same pattern followed for substitute and 
student teachers.359   
 
  Angered that fourteen years after Brown360 created an affirmative duty for school 
boards to disestablish their dual school systems teachers were still segregated as to 
race, Judge Johnson felt that the time for action had come.  Further delay was not an 
option.  To this end, the Judge issued a detailed desegregation order whose foundation 
was based on the simple proposition that “the school board will be guided by the ratio 
of Negro to white faculty members in the school system as a whole.”361  This was to 
be achieved by “hiring and assigning faculty members so that in each school the ratio of 
white to Negro faculty members [was] substantially the same as . . . throughout the 
system.”362  At that time, the ratio of white to black was 3 to 2.  Therefore, a 3 to 2 
ratio was to be the “ultimate objective” or proof of success in integrating faculty and 
staff.363  And, to help the school board achieve this ratio, the Judge laid out a specific 
schedule to follow.  In the first year, “at every school with fewer than twelve 
teachers,” the board was to have “at least two full-time teachers whose race [was] 
different from the race of the majority of faculty”;  for those schools with more than 12 
teachers, “at least one of every six faculty and staff members” was to differ from the 
majority.364  The second year would see the full implementation of the 3 to 2 ratio.365  
As to the troubling issue of how to move teachers to achieve these standards, the Judge 
left it up to the school board to find its preferred method.  However, the Judge noted 
that, should the school board not  “achieve faculty desegregation by inducing voluntary 
transfers or by filling vacancies,” then it was to do so “by the assignment and transfer 
of teachers from one school to another,” involuntarily if necessary.366 
 
This case was subsequently appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which, in a split decision, 
                                                 
355  Carr, 289 F. Supp. at 650. 
356  Id. at 651. 
357  Id. at 650. 
358  Id. 
359  Id. 
360  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
361  Carr, 289 F. Supp. at 654. 
362  Id. 
363  Id. 
364  Id. 
365  Id. 
366  Id. 
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modified Johnson’s decree.367  In particular, the majority on the panel questioned the 
application of explicit racial targets as a guide to integration.  Not that they objected to 
mandatory teacher transfers or even the idea of target dates, rather they were 
uncomfortable with the idea of fixed standards and the use of mathematical ratios based 
on race to determine full compliance.368  Consequently, they held that “because of the 
difficulties inherent in achieving a precise five-to-one ratio, this part of the district 
court’s order should be interpreted to mean substantially or approximately five to 
one.”369   
 
This was a position that the Circuit’s Chief Judge, John R. Brown, and others on the 
circuit court felt dangerous.370  While the specificity of Johnson’s opinion was 
something new, and perhaps scary, it was a necessary step if faculty integration was to 
succeed.  “Specifics are needed,” the Chief Judge wrote.371 “Specifics are needed by 
the school administrators.  Specifics are needed by the Negroes who have waited these 
14 years for ‘a bona fide unitary system where schools are not white schools or Negro 
schools -- just schools.’”372  And, though not explicitly stated, it was clear specific 
deadlines, standards and mathematical ratios were necessary if the district judges were 
to do the job given them.373  On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justices agreed with 
this view.374  “The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, while of 
course not intended to do so, would, we think, take from the order some of its capacity 
to expedite, by means of specific commands, the day when a completely unified, 
unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a hope.  We 
believe it best to leave Judge Johnson’s order as written rather than as modified by the 
2-1 panel.”375 
 
Things were a little more complicated when the issue moved from teachers to 
students.  It was not that the constitutional issues were significantly different, but that 
the practical problems in moving students was simply so much greater than that for 
faculty.  Consider the practical problems posed in the case of Swann v. Charlotte- 
                                                 
367  Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 400 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1968). 
368  Id. at 5-7. 
369  Id. 
370  The first opinion from the Fifth Circuit involved a panel of only three judges, one of 
whom objected to the views of the others.  Carr, 400 F.2d at 1.  Judge Brown’s comments are 
made in regards to a motion for the entire Fifth Circuit to hear the case en banc, a motion 
subsequently denied by a majority of the Court’s members.  Montgomery County Bd. of 
Educ. v. Carr, 402 F. 2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968). 
371  Carr, 402 F. 2d. at 785. 
372  Id. 
373  Id. 
374  United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-37 (1969). 
375  Id. at 235.  
45
Zelden: From Rights to Resources
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
Mecklenburg Board of Education.376  The difficulty was two-fold.  First, there was the 
intransigence of the school board.  In 1965 when this case was first filed, of the 20,000 
black students in the district, only 490 attended schools with whites, and most of those 
(80%) were in one school with seven white pupils.377  When asked to fix this problem, 
the school board, in common with many boards in the south at this time, chose to 
implement a freedom-of-choice plan in which students could transfer into any school 
they wished so long as they provided their own transportation.378  By the time things 
came to a head in a 1970 hearing, only some 14,000 of the now 24,000 black students 
attended integrated schools (this out of a total population of 84,000 students).379   The 
Board refused to go any further;  its members felt they had done enough to meet the 
court’s demands, and enough was enough.380  As one of the Board’s attorneys put it, 
“We truly felt that this school system had done what complied with the constitutional 
mandates.”381  The result was obstructionism and delay. 
 
Even more troubling were the problems posed by the districts size.  In 1960, as a 
cost saving measure, city and county officials merged the Charlotte city and 
Mecklenburg county schools into a single district. Spanning twenty-two miles east-
west, and thirty-six miles north-south, the district encompassed some 550 square 
miles.382   Mere size was not the only problem, however.  Adding difficulties was the 
fact that students were not evenly distributed across the district.383  Most blacks lived 
in the city, while whites were spread out across the city and county.384  Any integration 
plan was going to have to figure out a way of moving these bodies, or creating a truly 
unitary system would be an impossibility.  Moving students between schools, in fact, 
had been one of the key problems with the freedom-of-choice plan in place at this 
time.385 
 
As noted above, faced with the boards constant refusal to act on their own, Judge 
James McMillan appointed a receiver, Dr. John A. Finger, to come up with an effective 
integration plan.386  Dr. Finger’s response to the problems in this case was a mix of the 
                                                 
376  311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. N.C. 1970), vacated, 431 F. 2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff’d in part, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
377  Swann, 402 U.S. at 6-7; see also  SCHWARTZ, supra  note 317, at 14-18. 
378  Swann, 402 U.S. at 13. 
379  Id. at 7. 
380  Id. at 7-11; SCHWARTZ, supra  note 317, at 14-18 (describing the School Board’s views).  
381  SCHWARTZ, supra  note 317, at 14. 
382  For details of the school district see Swann, 402 U.S. at 6-7. 
383  Id. at 6. 
384  Id. 
385See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (W.D. 
N.C. 1969). 
386  A consultant will be designated by the court to prepare immediately plans and 
recommendations to the court for desegregation of the schools. The legal and practical 
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familiar and inventive.  In response to the Board’s intransigence and the concurrent 
problem of how to mix the student population to achieve racial parity, Finger chose to 
utilize cluster attendance zones, school pairing and the application of race based 
ratios.387  Cluster zones and school pairing were two related methods for promoting 
integration.  Under such plans, districts would be divided into attendance zones based 
on the racial make-up of the region.  Particular zones (and schools within zones) would 
then be paired together and the students of different races shifted between the schools 
to effectively mix the races.  Mixing could occur by grade (e.g. all the zone’s students 
in grades 1-4 would attend one school, while all those in 5-6 would attend the other) or 
by school (e.g. half the zone’s students would attend school A, while half would attend 
school B).388  In Charlotte, the Finger plan as finally adopted, called at the high school 
level for the use of attendance zones which were -- as described by the Supreme Court 
in is ruling in this matter -- “typically shaped like wedges of a pie, extending outward 
from the center of the city to the suburban and rural areas of the county in order to 
afford residents of the center city area access to outlying schools.”389   As each zone 
had only one school, the linking of city and rural parts of the county produced between 
seventeen and thirty-six percent integration.390   At the junior high level, the use of 
gerrymandered geographic zones was combined with the creation of nine ‘satellite’ 
(non-contiguous) zones with “inner-city Negro students . . . assigned by attendance 
zones to nine outlying predominantly white junior high schools, thereby substantially 
desegregating every junior high school in the system.”391  For the district’s seventy-six 
elementary schools, Finger minimized the use geographic zoning, and utilized instead a 
mix of satellite zoning, school pairing and school grouping to achieve between a nine to 
thirty-eight percent black presence in the schools.392 
 
As for the problems of district size and the attendant difficulty in mixing students 
living great distances away from each other, Dr. Finger chose the then revolutionary 
method of mandatory district-wide busing.393  Such busing was, in fact, the key to the 
Finger plan.  Cluster/satellite zoning and school pairing could only work if the students 
could be freely moved between the respective schools.  Given the size of the district, 
and the geographic split between city and county, a district-wide busing plan was a 
necessity if integration was to be achieved.394  To this end, the Court ordered that 
                                                                                                                         
considerations outlined in detail in earlier parts of this opinion and order are for his 
guidance.” Swann, 306 F. Supp. at 1313; see also  Swann, 311 F. Supp at 265 (noting 
appointment of Dr. Finger to this position). 
387  Swann, 311 F. Supp at 265 (describing the Finger plan). 
388  Id.; see also  Swann, 402 U.S. at 8-9. 
389  Swann, 402 U.S. at 8. 
390  Id. at 8. 
391  Id. at 8-9. 
392  Id. at 9. 
393  Swann, 311 F. Supp. at 268. 
394  See WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 133-139. 
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“transportation be offered on a uniform non-racial basis to all children whose 
reassignment to any school is necessary to bring about the reduction of segregation, 
and who live farther from the school to which they are assigned than the Board 
determines to be walking distance.”395  The judge acknowledged that under his plan, the 
district would have to bus as many as 10,000 students per day at a cost of just under 
forty dollars per student.  However, he pointed out that cost was “not a valid legal 
reason for continued denial of a constitutional right.”396 
 
The final step in the Finger plan was the setting of deadlines and target percentages 
of racial mixing as a means of judging success.397   In December 1969, Judge 
McMillan, in an interim order outlining the standards to be used in constructing an 
integration plan, had directed the school board to make every effort “to reach a 71-29 
ratio in the various schools so that there will be no basis for contending that one school 
is racially different from the others .”398  He further went on to note “that no school 
[should] be operated with an all-black or predominantly black student body, [and] that 
pupils of all grades [should] be assigned in such a way that as nearly as practicable the 
various schools at various grade levels [had] about the same proportion of black and 
white students.”399  And, while the Judge acknowledged that variations “from the 
norm” might be “unavoidable,” he stressed that the results of any integration plan 
should come as close to these ratios as possible.400  Two months later in his final 
decree imposing the Finger plan, the judge ordered that the plan be fully implemented by 
May 4th, 1970.401  After that date, the school board was to “adopt and implement a 
continuing program, computerized or otherwise, of assigning pupil and teachers during 
the school year as wall as at the start of each year for the conscious purpose of 
maintaining each school  . . . in a condition of desegregation.”402 
 
Subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, Swann joined 
Brown403 and Green404 in redefining policy on desegregation.   The school board 
challenged the Finger plan’s use of racial quotas, extreme gerrymandering of attendance 
zones and busing, as well as the requirement that every school to be desegregated to 
create a unitary district.405   On every count, the Supreme Court upheld Judge 
                                                 
395  Swann, 311 F. Supp at 268. 
396  Id. 
397  Id. at 267-69. 
398  Id. at 267-68. 
399  Id. at 268. 
400  Swann, 402 U.S. at 23-24. 
401  Swann, 311 F. Supp at 269-70. 
402  Id. at 269. 
403  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
404  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
405  Swann, 402 U.S. at 9-10. 
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McMillan.406  On the issue of racial quotas, for example, the Court noted that an 
“awareness of the racial composition of the whole school system [was] likely to be a 
useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations.”407  It 
therefore concluded that the use of “mathematical ratios” as a “starting point” -- though 
not necessarily as an “inflexible requirement” -- was within the “equitable remedial 
discretion of the District Court.”408  As to the “sometimes drastic” gerrymandering of 
attendance zones into forms that were “neither compact nor contiguous,” the Court also 
held that, as an “interim corrective measure” gerrymandering was within the District 
Court’s remedial powers.409  
 
All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to 
assign pupils to schools nearest their homes.  But all things are not equal in a 
system that had ben deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial 
segregation.  The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, 
inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on 
some;  but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim 
period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school 
systems.410 
 
The Justices thus held that “in a system with a history of segregation the need for 
remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority’s compliance with 
its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially 
disproportionate in their racial composition.”411  Where a school board’s integration plan 
allowed for the continuation of single-race schools, “the burden of showing that such 
school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory” rested with the school board.412  
The same logic held for the implementation of mandatory busing.  In as much as 
“busing had been an integral part of public education for years” (in the 1969-70 school 
year some 39% of all students nationwide were bused) it was up to the school board to 
show that the District Court’s use of busing to integrate the schools posed an 
unacceptable risk to the health or education of the child.413  Failing this, District Judges 
were well within their rights to order mandatory busing.414 
 
The impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Swann was electric.  It gave 
                                                 
406  Swann, 402 U.S. at 1.  It should be noted, that the Fourth Circuit upheld Judge 
McMillan on everything but the assignment of pupils attending elementary schools.  Swann, 
431 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1970). 
407  Swann, 402 U.S. at 25. 
408  Id. 
409  Id. at 27. 
410  Id. at 28. 
411  Id. at 26. 
412  Id. 
413  Id. at 29. 
414  Id. at 30. 
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constitutional force to the adoption by District Courts of race-based standards for 
integration, school pairing and mandatory busing on a wide scale.   In the months and  
years that followed Swann,  District Courts across the South implemented integration 
plans that included mathematical ratios, system-wide school pairing and mandatory 
busing in one form or another.  In Corpus Christi, Texas, for example, Judge Woodrow 
Seals invited the HEW to file a plan which would comply with the recently announced 
Swann requirements.415  That plan, largely adopted by the Judge, employed a mix of 
school pairing, restructured attendance zones and busing to solve the nettlesome 
problem posed by the school district’s tri-ethnic makeup (white, black and Hispanic).416 
  “From the figures available to the court,” the Judge concluded, “it appears that no 
school at any level will be ethnically identifiable.”417  In doing so, Seals continued, “this 
plan has a realistic chance of creating a unitary school system,” one that caused no 
“undue economic burden[s]” and would “not disrupt the educational process more than 
[was] necessary to secure rights guaranteed under the Constitution.”418  The same 
pattern was followed in Little Rock where, following Swann,419 the Court ordered the 
school board to create a new integration plan utilizing school pairing and grouping along 
with mandatory busing so as to “destroy their [the individual schools] former racial 
identifiability.”420  In Jefferson Parish Louisiana, Judge Christenberry, on motion from 
plaintiffs seeking the application of the Swann decision to this case, ordered the school 
board to draw up a new integration plan, one emphasizing school pairing and revised 
geographical attendance zones.421  He also demanded that the plan must provide for 
integration of faculty in such a manner that the racial ratio of the faculty in each school 
match the ratio for the district as a whole.422  Finally, on the troubling issue of busing, 
the judge was less demanding, suggesting that “while busing is a permissible tool for 
school desegregation, and undoubtedly will be necessary to some extent . . . busing 
should be a last-resort remedy.”423 
 
                                                 
415  Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent Sch. Dist., 330 F. Supp 1377, 1397 (S.D. Tex. 
1971). 
416  Id. at 1393-97. 
417  Id. at 1393. 
418  Id.  The court’s order was appealed to the Fifth Circuit which upheld the plan.  
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972).  However, a 
stay of execution was ordered by Justice Black which delayed implementation.  Cisneros, 404 
U.S. 1211, 1211 (1971).  After many additional hearings and conflicts, a new plan was ordered 
by Judge Owen Cox in July, 1975 which utilized a computer to work out a reassignment plan 
based loosely on the racial makeup of the district as a whole.  See Davis, supra  note 313, at 
A1. 
419  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
420  Clark v. Bd. of Dir., 328 F. Supp. 1205, 1219 (1971). 
421  Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 332 F. Supp. 590, 594-95 (E.D. La. 1971). 
422  3 RACE REL. L. SURV. 134, 134-5 (1971) (referring to Judge Christenberry’s July 9th order 
in Dandridge). 
423  Id. 
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As Judge Christenberry’s orders on busing shows, not all judges embraced the idea 
of mathematical ratios, system-wide school pairing and especially mandatory bussing.  
Some agreed with the firm position of Judge William Taylor who, in the Dallas School 
case, made clear that, “I am opposed to and do not believe in massive cross-town 
bussing of students for the sole purpose of mixing bodies.”424  Many more could agree 
with Judge Taylor that there were “many other tools at the command of the School 
Board” to fight segregation than busing.425  Yet these alternate, and presumably less 
intrusive, methods were also based, on the whole, in a race-based approach to 
integration.  One of the most popular methods for those wishing to minimize the need 
for cross-town busing was the application of a majority to minority transfer system. An 
outgrowth of the old freedom-of-choice plans of the early 1960s, and promoted by the 
Fifth Circuit in its Jefferson426 decision, majority to minority plans involved allowing 
students to transfer to any school they wished, so long as their race was in the minority 
in the new school.427  The idea was that the voluntary movement of students seeking a 
better education by moving to new schools in which their race was in the minority 
would provide the necessary push toward integration.  Widely adopted as either the sole 
method of integration or as a part of a wider integration plan,428 the problem with 
majority to minority plans was that it placed the burden of desegregation largely on 
minority students.  (Experience showed that few whites would voluntarily transfer to a 
black-majority school).429  These plans also had problems generating enough movement 
to produce a unitary school system.  As the Eight Circuit noted, “while it is true that the 
majority to minority transfer provision has the potential for alleviating the situation to an 
extent, it is in large part an illusory remedy.”430  Still, many judges liked the majority to 
                                                 
424  Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 948 (N.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d in part, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
425  Id.  It should be noted that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Swann, Judge Taylor 
did order limited bussing to achieve integration.  Id. at 956.  However, he continued in his 
opposition toward school pairing in Dallas, feeling that the “[c]ontiguous pairing or grouping 
of secondary level schools. . . [w]ould have only produced movement of white students from 
one school to another or all Black students from one school to another” as a result of the 
city’s segregated residential patterns.  Id.  
426  United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. 2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).  
427  ARMOR, supra note 58, at 162-63 (describing minority-to-majority transfer plans).  For 
an example of a Freedom-of-Choice plan in action, see ROBERT PRATT, THE COLOR OF THEIR 
SKIN 40-55 (1992). 
428  ARMOR, supra  note 58, at 167. 
429  In fact, experience showed that where freedom-of-choice type plans existed and 
formerly all-white schools became increasingly integrated, “many white parents withdrew 
their children from those schools and enrolled them in other white schools.”  PRATT, supra 
note 427, at 44.  While majority to minority plans ended this practice, it did little to undermine 
white reluctance to attend black majority schools (and hence, to promote white transfers to 
black schools). 
430  Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1035, 1044 (8th Cir. 1970). 
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minority approach because of its less intrusive effects.431 
 
Another popular approach, one usually proposed by those who wished to limit the 
disruptions associated with integration (and one that was not based on a race-focused 
application of the courts’ power) was the use of neighborhood schools.  Under a 
neighborhood plan, all students living in a residential neighborhood, irrespective of race, 
would attend the same schools.  Often paired with majority to minority efforts, such 
plans had the advantage of familiarity and moderation. By minimizing the need for 
busing, it was felt that these plans increased the chances of public (i.e. white) 
acceptance and thus minimized the risks for white flight.432  Unfortunately, given the 
prevalence of residential segregation, neighborhood school plans often failed to achieve 
the goal of integration. This failure made such plans constitutionally suspect.433   “The 
neighborhood school concept, no matter how attractive,” noted Judge Frank Kaufman 
of the Maryland District Court, “cannot, at the elementary or any higher level, compel a 
continued pattern of unconstitutional segregation.”434  The standard set by Green435 
was effectiveness and only effectiveness: did the plan end bi-racial school systems and 
did it do so “now.”436  If the method reinforced segregation rather than promoting 
desegregation, then that method was unacceptable.437  And while some judges were 
willing to try neighborhood school plans, most were forced to the unavoidable 
conclusion that such plans were not adequate remedies.438 
 
The conclusion is clear.  No matter what the particular views of the judge on the 
issue of race mixing and mandatory busing, the application of group-based remedies 
implicit in the receivership model made the shift to race based quota systems inevitable 
if the goals set by the Supreme Court were to be met -- a position implicitly accepted by 
the Supreme Court in its Swann439 ruling.440  And despite the constant hemming and 
                                                 
431  See Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp 1249, 1251 (N.D. Ga . 1973). 
432  See Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 950-51 (N.D. Tex. 1971).  
433  Examples where judges denied plans for neighborhood schools as constitutionally 
infirm include: Clark , 426 F. 2d at 1043; Cato v. Parham, 297 F. Supp. 403, 410 (E.D. Ark. 1969); 
Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp 1034, 1035-36 (D. Md. 1972).  It is interesting to note, 
however, that the Supreme Court never embraced the model that residential segregation 
resulting in dual school districts mandates such reactions as school busing.  In fact, the High 
Court “has never permitted the use of housing segregation as the sole basis for a school 
desegregation remedy.”  ARMOR, supra  note 58, at 10.   
434  Vaughns, 355 F. Supp at 1050. 
435  Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
436  Id. at 439. 
437  Id.; WILKINSON, supra  note 2, at 116; KULL, supra  note 4, at 194. 
438  Clark , 426 F.2d at 1043; Cato, 297 F. Supp at 410; Vaughns, 355 F. Supp at 1050. 
439  Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
440  By accepting Judge McMillan’s busing order, the Court logically had to accept its 
underlying race based quota standards of judging success or failure to achieve a unitary 
school district.  However, this acceptance was only implicit.  As Kull notes, even while they 
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hawing about only requiring “approximate” ratios, the plans that came out of the district 
courts were based primarily on the application of race membership to school placement. 
  Even where the judge disliked the group oriented nature of such plans, they had few 
options available if they were to fulfill their constitutional duty.  Once the decision had 
been made to apply the enforcement tools created to serve bankruptcy receiverships to 
desegregation matters, the shift to “benign racial sorting” was soon to follow. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
By 1974 the application of the receivership model to southern school desegregation 
was largely complete.  The years that followed would see a maturation of this practice, 
both in terms of its shift to the North and in its continued application in the South.  
Even in the face of Supreme Court indecision, and even retreat, on this issue,441 the 
general components of the receivership model (the retention of jurisdiction, the use of 
experts, mandatory injunctions and sweeping decrees, and a general group-focus to 
implemented remedies) remained strong.  It simply was too useful a tool if any 
integration were to be achieved.  For, in applying the familiar components of the equity 
receivership, district judges could overcome the practical dilemmas posed by popular 
opposition to integration.   
 
None of this is to say that the civil rights receivership was exactly the same as the 
economic receiverships of the past;  there were significant differences in focus and 
scope between the two processes.442  However, the old model provided a template for 
the new procedures, and with it, a conceptual framework that set outer parameters of 
available action.  More importantly, it gave judges a lead on how to handle the 
overwhelming pressures that immediate integration posed.  Once this “lead” was 
discovered, judges experimented with the process in response to actual enforcement 
difficulties.  The result was both similar and different to that of earlier cases. 
 
The effect of this use of traditional equity procedures was a radical expansion of the 
                                                                                                                         
supported 
a district judge who had taken a courageous stand on what he thought to be the 
implications of Green, [the justices] could not -- at least without provoking dissent -
- enjoy the district judge’s freedom to explain and justify the course the law was 
taking.  The opinions for the Supreme Court, in Swann and every major 
desegregation case that followed, refused to acknowledge that the ‘rules of the 
game’ had changed since Brown in any respect other than the timetable for 
compliance.  They accordingly offered no justification for the different 
constitutional rules that were now being enforced by the district courts. 
KULL, supra  note 4, at 196-97. 
441  Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
442  See Kirp & Babcock, supra  note 334, at 316-17. 
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influence of the federal courts.  From busing to orders for remedial education to 
decrees for new construction and beyond, the impact was explosive.  The federal 
courts, notes Mark Chadsey in his recent study of the federal courts and southern 
school desegregation, “played a significant . . . role  . . . as the creators of nearly all 
legal standards governing school desegregation.”  In fact, “between 1969 and 1973, the 
federal courts, acting alone, increased the number of desegregated black school children 
to over 90 percent.”443  Thus, though other forces were at work promoting change 
(Civil Rights Act of 1964, HEW), it was the federal courts that ultimately shaped the 
desegregation process: setting standards, promoting methods, integrating the efforts of 
other agencies, and ultimately, judging success or failure.  And it was the district judges 
who carried out most of this movement as they experimented to find answers to the 
many practical issues raised by integration.  In the process, these judges constructed a 
set of enforcement procedures and methods which, once adopted, made the shift to a 
group-based, results oriented jurisprudence in the schools and other civil rights matters, 
if not inevitable, hard to stop.  The result was the expansion of  this new model of civil 
rights across society, and with it, a revolution in rights whose effects are still felt today. 
                                                 
443  Chadsey, supra  note 245, at 218. 
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